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SUMMARY TABLE 
  2006 2007 2008 2009
 
OUTPUT 
 
(Real Annual Growth %)      
Private Consumer Expenditure  7.1 6.3 -2.2 -3.6
Public Net Current Expenditure  4.8 6.0 4.0 -1.0
Investment  4.0 1.2 -18.6 -19.3
Exports  5.7 6.8 0.6 -0.4
Imports  6.3 4.1 -2.7 -3.5
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)  5.7 6.0 -2.4 -3.9
Gross National Product (GNP)  6.3 4.1 -2.6 -4.6
GNP per capita (constant prices)  3.7 1.8 -4.5 -4.3
 
PRICES 
 
(Annual Growth %)       
Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP)  2.7 2.8 3.3 0.5
Consumer Price Index (CPI)  4.0 4.9 4.2 -2.0
Wage Growth  4.9 4.8 2.6 0.0
 
LABOUR MARKET    
Employment Levels (ILO basis (000s))  2,044 2,117 2,107 1,991
Unemployment Levels (ILO basis (000s))  95 100 136 207
Unemployment Rate (as % of Labour Force)  4.4 4.5 6.1 9.4
 
PUBLIC FINANCE    
Exchequer Balance (€m)  2,264 -1,619 -12,880 -16,656
General Government Balance (€m)  5,327 443 -12,885 -18,246
General Government Balance (% of GDP)  3.0 0.2 -6.9 -10.2
General Government Debt (% of GDP)  24.7 24.8 36.7 47.5
 
EXTERNAL TRADE    
Balance of Payments Current Account (€m)  6,298.0 -10,303.0 6,047.1 -974.2
Current Account (% of GNP)  -4.1 -6.4 -3.8 -0.6
 
EXCHANGE AND INTEREST RATES (end of year)       
US$/€ Exchange Rate  1.26 1.39 1.47 1.32
STG£/€ Exchange Rate   0.68 0.69 0.79 0.79
Main ECB Interest Rate   3.50 4.00 2.50 2.00
    

 1 
SUMMARY 
The forecasts in this Commentary, especially for 2009, illustrate how the Irish economy is in the midst of a 
contraction that is large by both historic and international comparisons. For 2009, we expect GNP to fall by 
4.6 per cent in volume terms. Following an anticipated contraction of 2.6 per cent in 2008, the accumulated 
fall in output is dramatic. 
 
The volume of consumption is expected to fall by 3.6 per cent in 2009. The fall in investment is expected to 
be larger still. We are forecasting a fall of 19.3 per cent in investment volume in 2009. This figure is made up 
of a huge fall in building activity, both residential and commercial, with volume falling by 26 per cent.  
 
Many of Ireland’s trading partners are now in recession and are expected to record falls in output volumes in 
2009. For example, the OECD expects the US to contract by 0.9 per cent in 2009 and the Euro Area to 
contract by 0.6 per cent. Prospects for the UK are even worse, with a fall in GDP of 1.1 per cent expected 
in 2009. As a result of these anticipated outcomes, we expect Ireland’s exports to fall by 0.4 per cent next 
year. 
 
The downturn has already manifested itself in the labour market and the public finances. The rate of 
unemployment has jumped from 4.6 per cent in Quarter 1 of this year to 7 per cent in Quarter 3. Tax 
revenues have fallen rapidly, with current revenues likely to be almost 13 per cent lower in 2008 relative to 
2007. 
 
We now expect that average employment will fall by 117,000 in 2009, and consequently the total employed 
will be well below 2 million by the end of the year. This fall in employment will be distributed across 
changes in unemployment, migration and participation. It is very difficult to estimate how each will change 
but we can say that a fall in employment of that size will be consistent with net outward migration of 50,000, 
the unemployment rate averaging 9.4 per cent and participation falling by 1.3 percentage points. 
 
On the public finances, we expect the General Government Deficit to be 6.9 per cent of GDP in 2008 and 
10.2 per cent in 2009. Such deficits, when combined with the contracting economy, imply that the general 
government debt will reach 47.5 per cent of GDP in 2009, up from 36.7 per cent in 2008.  
 
On inflation, the global economic downturn is leading to falling commodity prices and reduced wage 
pressures. Taking account of these, we expect HICP inflation to average 0.5 per cent in 2009. With interest 
rates falling rapidly, we expect CPI inflation to be negative, at -2 per cent. For the economy as a whole, we 
expect zero wage growth in 2009. As wages in the public sector will show an increase during 2009 as a result 
of an increase granted in September 2008, implicit in our forecasts is a wage fall in the private sector in 2009. 
 
In our General Assessment, we argue that policy options are very limited in terms of the short-run alleviation 
of the current difficulties. The focus of policy should be on ensuring that Ireland is as well placed as possible 
to participate in the global upturn. As part of this strategy, we need to ensure that the public finances do not 
become a constraint on growth, as they did in the 1980s. With this in mind, we would stress yet again the 
importance of ensuring quality in all public spending, whether current or capital. We would also re-iterate a 
point that was made in the last Commentary, namely, the likelihood in the medium term of a need for tax 
increases as a result of the erosion in the tax base in recent years. In addition, we would also argue that the 
deterioration in the public finances will make it difficult for the government to pay the 3.5 per cent increase 
in September due under the pay agreement. We argue that the social partners need to come together and to 
reassess the most recent pay deal in the light of rapidly changing circumstances. The possibility of nominal 
pay cuts in the public sector should at least be considered in this context as pay cuts may well be considered 
preferable to cuts in services. As well as protecting services levels, the pay adjustment approach to 
economies could well yield expenditure savings more rapidly than an approach based solely on job cuts 
through natural wastage, early retirements and redundancy schemes. Finally, new research presented in this 
Commentary on the public/private wage differential suggests that there is a significant pay advantage for those 
working in the public sector and that this may have increased in recent years. Given this, it seems highly 
unlikely that any wage reductions in the public sector would, in general, lead to any significant challenges in 
terms of retaining or recruiting staff. 
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NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2007 (Estimate) 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
    
 2006 2007 Change in 2007 
  Estimate €m  % 
 €m €m Value Volume  Value Price Volume 
          
Private Consumer Expenditure 83,688 91,582 7,894 5,287  9.4 2.9 6.3 
Public Net Current Expenditure 24,314 26,766 2,452 1,447  10.1 3.9 6.0 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 47,632 50,140 2,507 571   5.3 4.0 1.2 
Exports of Goods and Services (X) 141,663 151,390  9,727  9,610  6.9  0.1 6.8 
Physical Changes in Stocks 1,342   -95  -1,437  -1,453     
          
Final Demand 298,640 319,782 21,142 15,462  7.1 1.8 5.2 
less:        
Imports of Goods and Services (M) 122,627 131,017 8,390 4,984  6.8 2.7 4.1 
less:        
Statistical Discrepancy -1,274 -1,838 -564 -207     
        
GDP at Market Prices 177,286 190,603 13,316 10,685  7.5 1.4 6.0 
less:        
Net Factor Payments (F) -24,830 -29,393 -4,563 -4,384  18.4  0.6  17.7 
          
GNP at Market Prices 152,456 161,210 8,754  6,300  5.7 1.5 4.1 
B: Gross National Product by Origin 
    
 2006 2007 Change in 2007 
  Estimate   
 €m €m €m % 
     
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 3,084 3,456 372 12.1 
Non-Agricultural: Wages, etc. 71,900 78,211 6,310 8.8 
  Other: 63,482 70,087 6,605 10.4 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation  157 -362   
 Statistical Discrepancy -1,274 -1,838   
     
Net Domestic Product 137,351 149,555 12,204 8.9 
less:     
Net Factor Payments -24,830 -29,393 -4,563 18.4 
     
National Income 112,520 120,162 7,642 6.8 
Depreciation 17,549 18,534   985 5.6 
     
GNP at Factor Cost 130,069 138,696 8,627 6.6 
Taxes less Subsidies 22,387 22,514 127 0.6 
     
GNP at Market Prices 152,456 161,210 8,754 5.7 
C:  Balance of Payments on Current Account 
    
 2006 2007 Change in 2007 
  Estimate  
      €m €m          €m 
Exports (X) less Imports (M) 19,036 20,373 1,337 
Net Factor Payments (F) -24,830 -29,393 -4,563 
Net Transfers -504 -1,283  -779 
    
Balance on Current Account -6,298 -10,303 -4,005 
as % of GNP -4.1 -6.4            -2.3 
D: GNDI and Terms of Trade 
    
 2006 2007 2007 Volume 
Change 
  Estimate   
 €m €m €m    % 
Terms of Trade Loss or Gain  -3,819  
GNP Adjusted for Terms of Trade 152,456 154,937 2,481 1.6 
GNDI*     151,952 153,688 1,735 1.1 
National Resources** 152,175 153,750 1,574 1.0 
* GNDI is GDP adjusted for terms of trade and net international transfers. 
** GNDI including capital transfers. 
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FORECAST NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2008 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product  
    
 2007 2008 Change in 2008 
 Estimate Forecast €m  % 
 €m €m Value Volume  Value Price Volume 
        
Private Consumer Expenditure 91,582 91,359 -223    -2,015 -0.2 2.0 -2.2 
Public Net Current Expenditure 26,766 29,175 2,409 1,071 9.0 4.8 4.0 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 50,140 39,782 -10,358 -9,340 -20.7 -2.5 -18.6 
Exports of Goods and Services (X) 151,390 150,987 -403 976 -0.3 -0.9 0.6 
Physical Changes in Stocks -95 995  1,090 0    
       
Final Demand 319,782 312,297 -7,485 -8,098 -2.3 0.2 -2.5 
less:       
Imports of Goods and Services (M) 131,017 128,490 -2,527 -3,496 -1.9 0.8 -2.7 
less:       
Statistical Discrepancy -1,838 -1,838 0   11    
       
GDP at Market Prices 190,603 185,645 -4,957 -4,612 -2.6 -0.2 -2.4 
less:       
Net Factor Payments (F) -29,393 -27,262 2,131 391 -7.3 -6.0 -1.3 
          
GNP at Market Prices 161,210 158,383 -2,826 -4,224 -1.8 0.9 -2.6 
        
B:  Gross National Product by Origin  
    
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
Change in 2008 
 
 Estimate Forecast   
 €m €m €m % 
     
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 3,456 3,456  0 0.0 
Non-Agricultural: Wages, etc. 78,211 79,705 1,495 1.9 
  Other: 70,087 66,074 -4,014 -5.7 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation -362 -200   
 Statistical Discrepancy -1,838 -1,838   
     
Net Domestic Product 149,555 147,197 -2,357 -1.6 
less:     
Net Factor Payments -29,393 -27,262 2,131 -7.3 
     
National Income 120,162 119,936 -226 -0.2 
Depreciation 18,534 18,632  98 0.5 
     
GNP at Factor Cost 138,696 138,568 -128 -0.1 
Taxes less Subsidies 22,514  19,815 -2,698 -12.0 
     
GNP at Market Prices 161,210 158,383 -2,826 -1.8 
     
C:  Balance of Payments on Current Account  
    
 2007 2008 Change in 2008 
 Estimate Forecast  
 €m €m €m 
Exports (X) less Imports (M) 20,373 22,498 2,125 
Net Factor Payments (F) -29,393 -27,262 2,131 
Net Transfers -1,283 -1,283 0 
    
Balance on Current Account -10,303 -6,047 4,256 
as % of GNP         -6.4            -3.8 2.6 
    
D: GNDI and Terms of Trade 
    
 2007 2008 2008 Volume 
Change 
  Estimate   
 €m €m €m % 
Terms of Trade Loss or Gain  -3,421   
GNP Adjusted for Terms of Trade 161,210 154,482 -6,741 -4.2 
GNDI* 159,927 153,196 -6,731 -4.2 
National Resources** 159,989 153,496 -6,493 -4.1 
* GNDI is GDP adjusted for terms of trade and net international transfers. 
** GNDI including capital transfers. 
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FORECAST NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2009 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
    
 2008 2009  Change in 2009 
 Forecast Forecast  €m  % 
 €m €m  Value Volume  Value Price Volume
          
Private Consumer Expenditure 91,359 88,290  -3,069 -3,289  -3.4 0.3 -3.6 
Public Net Current Expenditure 29,175 28,970    -204 -292  -0.7 0.3 -1.0 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 39,782 30,261  -9,521 -7,673  -23.9 -5.8 -19.3 
Exports of Goods and Services (X) 150,987 152,243  1,256 -654  0.8 1.3 -0.4 
Physical Changes in Stocks 995 1,100  105 0   0.0 0.0 
          
Final Demand 312,297 300,865  -11,433 -11,723  -3.7 0.1 -3.8 
less:          
Imports of Goods and Services (M) 128,490 124,258  -4,232 -4,472  -3.3 0.0  0.0 
less:          
Statistical Discrepancy -1,838 -1,838  0  5   0.2 -3.5 
          
GDP at Market Prices 185,645 178,444  -7,201 -7,256  -3.9 0.0 -3.9 
less:          
Net Factor Payments (F) -27,262 -27,677  -415 128   1.5 2.0 -0.5 
          
GNP at Market Prices 158,383 150,768  -7,616 -7,207  -4.8 -0.3 -4.6 
          
B: Gross National Product by Origin 
    
 2008 2009 Change in 2009 
 Forecast Forecast   
 €m €m €m % 
     
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 3,456 3,387 -69 -2.0 
Non-Agricultural: Wages, etc. 79,705 75,097 -4,609 -5.8 
  Other: 66,074 65,570 -504 -0.8 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation -200 -200   
         Statistical .Discrepancy -1,838 -1,838   
     
Net Domestic Product 147,197 142,015 -5,182 -3.5 
less:     
Net Factor Payments -27,262 -27,677 -415  1.5 
     
National Income 119,936 114,339 -5,597 -4.7 
Depreciation 18,632 18,436 -197 -1.1 
     
GNP at Factor Cost 138,568 132,775 -5,793  -4.2 
Taxes less Subsidies 19,815 17,993 -1,822 -9.2 
     
GNP at Market Prices 158,383 150,768 -7,616 -4.8 
     
C: Balance of Payments on Current Account  
    
 2008 2009 Change in 2009 
 Estimate Forecast  
 €m €m €m 
Exports (X) less Imports (M) 22,498 27,985 5,488 
Net Factor Payments (F) -27,262 -27,677 -415 
Net Transfers 
 
-1,283 
 
-1,283 
 
0 
 
Balance on Current Account -6,047 -974 5,073 
as % of GNP -3.8 -0.6 3.2 
    
D: GNDI and Terms of Trade 
    
 2008 2009 2009 Volume Change 
  Estimate  
 €m €m €m % 
Terms of Trade Loss or Gain  -1,616   
GNP Adjusted for Terms of Trade 158,383 152,793 -5,591 -3.5 
GNDI* 157,100 151,512 - 5,588 -3.6 
National Resources** 157,400 151,812 -5,588 -3.6 
* GNDI is GDP adjusted for terms of trade and net international transfers. 
** GNDI including capital transfers.
 5 
THE INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMY1 
The main developments in the international economy can be summarised 
as follows: 
 
• All of the world’s major economies are now contracting, with 
the pace of contraction appearing to have accelerated since late 
summer/early autumn. 
 
• On-going difficulties in financial markets seem to have impacted 
upon business and consumer confidence. Consumption and 
investment are falling in many economies and sentiment indices 
have fallen to historically low levels, thereby pointing to a 
continuation of these trends. 
 
• Falling demand is impacting on commodity prices. Oil has been 
trading in the region of US$45 per barrel, well down on its highs 
of earlier this year. 
 
• Falling commodity prices, the associated easing in inflationary 
pressures and the weakening of the world’s economies have led 
to central banks cutting interest rates at a historically fast pace. 
Central banks have also been engaged in providing liquidity to 
money markets while governments have taken actions to support 
banks, including nationalisation.  
 
• While huge doubts remain over the trajectory which the world 
will follow in the coming months, OECD forecasts are based on 
a bottoming out of the cycle in many countries in mid-2009, 
followed by a very modest pick-up in the latter part of next year. 
In many ways, this should be viewed as a “best case scenario” as 
the possibility of a more prolonged global downturn remains. 
 
 
 
1 The discussion in this section is based largely on the OECD’s Economic Outlook from 
November 2008 and the Euroframe Economic Assessment of the Euro Area, also from 
November. 
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The Euro Area is now in recession, having experienced quarter-on-
quarter contractions of 0.2 per cent in both second and third quarters of 
2008. Reductions in private consumption and in business fixed investment 
have added to the difficulties arising from the slump in housing investment. 
Exports also declined as a result of weaker external demand and the 
strength of the euro. These developments are now showing up in the 
labour market, with the rate of unemployment rising to 7.5 per cent, up 
from a cyclical trough of 7.2 per cent. 
 
For 2008, GDP growth of 1 per cent is now expected. This is well down 
on the 2007 growth figure of 2.6 per cent. However, sentiment indicators 
suggest that the economic difficulties are becoming more pronounced and 
so a contraction of 0.6 per cent is now expected for the year 2009. 
Consumption demand is expected to be essentially static in 2009, while 
investment is expected to contract by 4.4 per cent. On-going weakness in 
the world economy will see net exports making a zero contribution to 
overall growth.  
 
The poor conditions in 2009 are expected to lead to the rate of 
unemployment rising to 8.6 per cent. This, in turn, should lead to less 
pressure on wages. When combined with falling commodity prices, HICP 
inflation is expected to fall to 1.4 per cent in 2009, down from 3.4 per cent 
in 2008. Such an easing in price pressures provides scope for the ECB to 
remain on the path of aggressive interest rates cuts and many 
commentators now foresee rates at 2 per cent in the spring of 2009. Such 
rate cuts would normally be expected, with some confidence, to translate 
into lower rates for businesses and consumers and hence higher levels of 
demand. However, the continued problems in financial markets lead to 
doubts about the usual processes. 
 
Uncertainty over the potential impacts of monetary easing has led to 
proposals for a coordinated fiscal stimulus at an EU level. At the time of 
writing, it is still unclear as to whether such an approach will be adopted. 
Whether such initiative is pursued or not, it is generally accepted that 
economic activity will not begin to pick up until mid-2009 at the earliest 
and that even then the pace of upturn will be slow. According to the 
OECD, an acceleration in the upturn can only be expected in mid-2010. 
 
Turning now to countries within the Euro Area, Germany registered a 
strong pace of economic growth at the outset of 2008 but since then has 
fallen into recession. As a result of the good performance up to the first 
quarter, GDP is expected to grow by 1.4 per cent in 2008 but this masks 
the deterioration during the course of the year. For 2009, GDP is expected 
to fall by 0.8 per cent. In recent years, the strength of the German economy 
was its export performance, with growth rates of 13.1 per cent and 7.7 per 
cent in 2006 and 2007 respectively. The collapse in external demand 
suggests that export growth could be just 0.7 per cent in 2009. 
Unemployment is expected to rise to 8.1 per cent in 2009, with HICP 
inflation moderating to 1.1 per cent. 
 
The French economy is following a broadly similar pattern to that of 
Germany. Technically, France has not fallen into recession because GDP 
Euro area 
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registered an increase of 0.1 per cent in the third quarter, following a fall of 
0.3 per cent in the second quarter. However, activity is expected to contract 
in the remainder of 2008 and into 2009. For 2008, GDP growth of 0.9 per 
cent is forecast but the corresponding figure for 2009 is expected to be -0.4 
per cent. The rate of unemployment is expected to rise to 8.2 per cent in 
2009, with HICP inflation falling to 1 per cent. As regards the public 
finances, the general government deficit is expected to reach 3.7 per cent of 
GDP in 2009. For Germany, the corresponding figure is 0.9 per cent. In 
spite of the lower deficit in Germany, there appears to be greater 
enthusiasm on the part of the French government for a coordinated fiscal 
stimulus relative to its German counterpart. 
 
For Italy, the early part of the year was also characterised by weakening 
economic activity. As a result, it is expected to experience a contraction in 
GDP in 2008, in contrast to France and Germany. The contraction is 
expected to be 0.4 per cent, with a further contraction of 1 per cent 
expected in 2009.  
Figure 1: Interest Rates* 
-2.0
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
2002M01 2003M01 2004M01 2005M01 2006M01 2007M01 2008M01 2009M01
%
ECB Main Refinancing Rate Irish Mortgage Rate - nominal Irish Mortgage Rate - real  
*Mortgage rate used is the Home Purchase Loans Average Interest Rate. 
Source: CSO. 
 
 The downturn in the UK economy is expected to be more severe than 
that of the Euro Area. Whereas GDP for the Euro Area is expected to 
contract by 0.6 per cent in 2009, the contraction for the UK economy is 
expected to be almost twice this, at -1.1 per cent. There are two broad 
explanations for this relatively steep decline in the UK. First, the UK is 
experiencing a severe contraction in residential construction. For 2009, the 
fall in house building activity is expected to be 14.3 per cent; for the Euro 
Area, the fall in residential building is expected to be 7.3 per cent. Part of 
this house building downturn can be explained by the collapse in house 
prices in the UK. A second reason behind the UK’s steeper decline is the 
greater importance of financial services in total output. 
United 
Kingdom 
  
Table 1: Short term International Outlook 
 
             
 GDP Output Growth Consumer Price 
Inflation* 
Unemployment Rate 
 
Current Account Balance 
       % % of GDP 
             
Country 2007    2008 2009 2007 2008 2009 2007 2008 2009 2007 2008 2009 
             
UK 3.0 0.8 -1.1 2.3 3.7 2.7 5.4 5.5 6.8 -3.8 -1.9 -1.5 
Germany 2.6 1.4 -0.8 2.3 2.9 1.1 8.3 7.4 8.1 7.7 6.4 6.2 
France 2.1 0.9 -0.4 1.6 3.3 1.0 8.0 7.3 8.2 -1.2 -1.6 -1.5 
Italy 1.4 -0.4 -1.0 2.0 3.5 1.5 6.2 6.9 7.8 -2.5 -2.6 -2.1 
             
Euro Area 2.6 1.0 -0.6 2.1 3.4 1.4 7.4 8.6 9.0 0.3 -0.4 -0.1 
USA 2.0 1.4 -0.9 2.9 4.3 1.6  4.6 5.7 7.3 -5.3 -4.9 -3.9 
Japan 2.1 0.5 -0.1  0.1  1.4 0.3 3.9 4.1 4.4 4.8 3.8 4.3 
China 11.9  9.5  8.0 4.8 6.1 3.0    11.3 9.7 9.4 
             
OECD 2.7 3.1 2.6 2.3 3.3 1.7 5.6 5.9 6.9 -1.4 -1.5 -1.1 
             
Ireland 6.0 -2.4 -3.9 2.8 3.3 0.5 4.5 6.1 9.4 -5.4 -3.3 -0.5 
             
Source: OECD Economic Outlook No. 84, December  2008. 
   * HICP for Euro Area countries and the UK, CPI otherwise. 
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The effects of the downturn are now being seen in the UK’s labour 
market. The unemployment rate rose by 0.4 of a percentage point to 5.8 
per cent in the three months ending in September. The numbers 
unemployed (at 1.82 million) is now higher than at any time since 1997. 
The unemployment rate is expected to increase to 6.8 per cent in 2009, 
with employment falling by 1.8 per cent next year. 
 
The severe difficulties facing the UK economy have led to sizeable 
policy steps on both the monetary and fiscal fronts. The Bank of England 
has cut rates rapidly and they are now at 2 per cent, the lowest level since 
1951. Recognising that such cuts may not be sufficient to prevent a steep 
and prolonged downturn, the government has announced a fiscal stimulus 
package which will see borrowing rise to 8 per cent of GDP in 2009. The 
UK government has also moved to recapitalise its banks and has 
announced plans with a value of £50 billion. Yet another possible source of 
stimulus for  the UK economy arises from the fall in the value of sterling. 
In spite all these potential pluses for the UK economy, the sluggish 
performance is expected to last into 2010, with the OECD expecting 
growth of just 0.9 per cent in that year. 
 
 GDP fell at an annual rate of 0.5 per cent in the United States in the 
third quarter. Although the corresponding figure for the second quarter 
was an impressive +2.8 per cent, it was generally recognised that the Q2 
performance had been artificially boosted by the fiscal stimulus of early 
2008 and that the US had been experiencing an underlying downturn for 
some time. The problems for the US economy began in 2007 with falling 
house prices and declines in house building activity. Since then, the 
difficulties in financial markets have meant that falls in both consumer 
spending and in non-residential investment are now adding to the 
economic woes. Consumption fell by 3.7 per cent (annualised) in the third 
quarter; non-residential fixed investment fell by 1.5 per cent (again, 
annualised).  
 
While these figures illustrate the economic difficulties, figures on car 
sales provide a starker picture. US car sales were 32 per cent lower in 
October 2008 relative to the same month in 2007. The actual monthly sales 
figure was the lowest since January 1991. Adjusting for population size, it 
was the lowest monthly sales total since World War II. The starkness of the 
situation can also be seen in developments in the labour market. 
Employment fell over 500,000 in November alone, with over 1.25 million 
jobs having been lost since August. (Total employment in the US is 146 
million.) The unemployment rate increase by 0.6 of a percentage point 
between September and November, reaching 6.7 per cent. 
 
As in other countries, the economic difficulties have led to significant 
policy interventions. The Federal Reserve has been amongst the most 
aggressive of rate cutters and has brought the official rate down to 1 per 
cent. Congress eventually passed the US$700 billion package whose original 
purpose was to buy up so-called “toxic assets” in an effort to free up 
financial markets. A large-scale fiscal stimulus package is under discussion 
and it appears likely that this will be enacted early in 2009. 
United States 
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The latest forecast from the OECD sees GDP growing by 1.4 per cent 
in 2008 and declining by 0.9 per cent in 2009. The OECD also expects that 
mid-2009 will see a bottoming out in the downturn in the US as normality 
begins to return to financial markets and the aggressive actions on the part 
of the Fed begin to yield results.  
Figure 2: Exchange Rates 
0.80
0.90
1.00
1.10
1.20
1.30
1.40
1.50
1.60
2000Q01 2001Q01 2002Q01 2003Q01 2004Q01 2005Q01 2006Q01 2007Q01 2008Q01 2009Q01
USD/EUR
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
GBP/EUR
USD/EUR GBP/EUR  
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Autumn Report 2008 (forecast). 
 
 Japan had been enjoying its longest period of continued expansion since 
World War II but this came to an end in the middle of 2008. A contraction 
in exports led the overall contraction, due to a fall in global demand and an 
appreciation of the yen. For 2008, growth of 0.5 per cent is now expected. 
The falling demand for exports is expected to continue into 2009 but there 
will be some counterbalancing from a fiscal stimulus and increased housing 
output. This latter effect will arise due to a slump in activity in the latter 
part of 2007 as a result of changes to building standards laws. For 2009, a 
GDP contraction of 0.1 per cent in expected.  
 
GDP growth in China is moderating and is expected to be 9.5 per cent 
in 2008, down from 11.9 per cent in 2007. The deceleration has prompted 
the Chinese authorities to engage in a fiscal stimulus and also to cut interest 
rates. For 2009, growth of 8 per cent is anticipated. 
 
 With Ireland’s major trading partners now in a recession that is likely to 
persist at least into the middle of 2009 the international environment is 
going to be very difficult. Added to this is the strength of the euro relative 
to sterling, a factor which will weigh heavily on exports to the UK. In spite 
of this, the high level of policy activity on the parts of central banks and 
governments holds out the possibility that the world’s major economies 
will begin to show signs of recovery in the middle of 2009. The OECD 
holds this view, with positive quarter-on-quarter growth expected to 
resume in the third quarter across the US, Japan and the Euro Area. 
 
Asia 
Context for 
Ireland 
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THE DOMESTIC 
ECONOMY 
One year ago we were forecasting a growth rate of 2.3 per cent in GNP 
for 2008. Our latest estimates suggest it will now contract by 2.6 per cent. 
Within a short twelve months our forecasts have switched from downturn 
to prolonged recession. We now expect the economy to remain in 
recession throughout 2009, with both consumption and investment weak 
throughout the year. We do pencil in the possibility that there will be a 
small upturn in exports towards the latter half of 2009, if there is a recovery 
in world growth and world trade at that stage. Nevertheless, this recovery is 
not sufficient to lead to an increase in volume exports in 2009. 
 
Our forecasts imply a very rapid rise in the unemployment rate, to 
average 9.4 per cent in 2009. On a quarterly basis this is consistent with an 
unemployment rate of 10.2 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2009. With 
rising unemployment and falling output the public finances move into 
significant deficit, with a general government borrowing requirement of 
over 10 per cent of GDP in 2009. This implies an increase in the 
government’s net debt position from 12 per cent of GDP in 2007 to 34 per 
cent in 2009. 
 
 The quarterly national accounts for Q2 2008 showed how consumption 
had fallen by 3 per cent in Q2 relative to Q1 (seasonally adjusted). When 
compared to the volume of consumption in Q2 2007, the volume in Q2 
2008 was 1.4 per cent lower. More recent data from the retail sales index 
show that the decline appears to be accelerating. In September, the index 
was 6.2 per cent lower than in September 2007. As shown in Figure 3, the 
year-on-year change in the index turned negative in February and the 
general trend since then has been for the index to register increasingly 
larger falls relative to the same month last year. Excluding the motor trade, 
the fall in the index in September relative to September 2007 was 5.7 per 
cent. This picture of declining consumer spending is reflected in the 
KBC/ESRI Consumer Sentiment Index. Although the index showed a 
marginal monthly increase in November, the reading of 44.8 should be 
compared with the November 2007 reading of 63.1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
General 
Consumption 
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Figure 3: Retail Sales Index Volume Growth Rate (Year-on-Year) 
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Based on data for the year so far and our view that a range of factors, 
such as fears of growing unemployment, will continue to depress 
consumption we expect the volume of consumption to fall by 2.2 per cent 
in 2008. For 2009, we do not foresee a return to positive growth in 
consumption during the course of year, and for the year as a whole we 
expect the volume of consumption to contract by 3.6 per cent.  
 
 Investment growth in the Irish economy has been falling since the first 
quarter of 2007 (see Figure 4). On an annualised basis, these data suggest 
that the annual growth rate for 2007 was just 1.2 per cent, six months later 
in 2008 Q2 this had fallen to -13.2 per cent. While this dramatic slowdown 
in 2007 was exclusively related to the housing market, we expect that in 
2008 and more sharply in 2009 the commercial and retail investment sector 
will also contract sharply.  
Figure 4: Quarterly Growth in Investment, Seasonally Adjusted 
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Source: Quarterly National Accounts, Central Statistics Office. 
Investment 
  
Table 2: Gross Fixed Capital Formation   
        
 2006 % Change in 2007 2007 % Change in 2008 2008 % Change in 2009 2009 
           
 €m Volume Value €m Volume Value    €m Volume Value €m 
           
Housing 22,664 -9.2 -2.8 22,037 -32.5 -36.3 14,039 -37.3 -41.2 8,253 
           
Other Building 11,135 19.2 20.7 13,436 0.0 -1.0 13,301 -12.0 -20.8 10,535 
           
Transfer Costs 4,168 -19.1 -13.5 3,606 -42.0 -40.0 2,164 -40.0 -40.0 1,298 
           
Building and   
Construction 37,967 -1.9  2.9 39,079 -21.8 -24.5 29,504 -26.0 -31.9 20,086 
           
Machinery and 
Equipment  9,665 13.5 14.4 11,061 -8.0 -7.1 10,278 0.0 -1.0 10,175 
           
Total 47,632 1.2 5.3 50,140 -18.6 -20.7 39,782 -19.3 -23.9 30,261 
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In the Autumn QEC we estimated housing completions of 45,000 in 
2008 and 25,000 in 2009. We have revised these figures to 47,500 in 2008 
and 22,500 in 2009. This revision is due to the fact that total completions 
for the first ten months of the year are running slightly above 43,500 so 
that our figure for 2008 has been revised upwards. For 2009 we have 
brought down our estimate based on the very rapid decline in 
commencements and house registrations data in recent months – see 
Figure 5. The figure for commencements suggest an annual total of just 
over 27,600 houses for the year ended October 2008, while data on house 
registrations for the year ended October 2008 show an annual total of just 
over 15,000. Based on these estimates we now expect total housing 
investment over the next eighteen months to contract sharply with volume 
investment in housing falling by 33 per cent in volume terms in 2008, and a 
further 37 per cent in 2009.  
Figure 5: Housing Statistics, Annualised Numbers 
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In terms of house prices, the latest NIE data suggest an annual growth 
in the dwellings investment deflator of 7.6 per cent in 2007. However, this 
annual average figure masks a steady decline in the pace of dwellings 
inflation through the year so that by the end of 2008 Q2 this figure had 
fallen to 0 per cent. Other measures of house prices all point to a strong 
downward trend. Quarterly data from the DoEHLG suggest that new 
house prices peaked in the second quarter of 2007, falling over 6 per cent 
from that peak by 2008 Q2. Monthly data from the permanent tsb/ESRI 
new house price index suggest new house prices peaked in February 2007 
and have been falling steadily since then, down 12.3 per cent from that 
peak by October 2008.  
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Table 3: Growth Rate in Different Measures of House Prices 
            
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008f  2009f  
Dwellings 
Deflator 
 
12.7 
 
10.7 
 
9.8 
 
11.1 
 
15.3 
 
13.0 
 
6.5 
 
8.3 
 
7.6 
 
-8.0 
 
-10.0 
 
DoEHLG new 
house prices 
 
18.5 
 
13.9 
 
8.1 
 
8.3 
 
13.4 
 
11.0 
 
10.8 
 
10.6 
 
5.6 
 
-8.0 
 
-12.2 
 
permanent 
tsb/ESRI new 
house prices 
 
 
21.3 
 
 
18.8 
 
 
15.3 
 
 
4.1 
 
 
10.1 
 
 
12.8 
 
 
8.7 
 
 
12.5 
 
 
1.7 
 
 
-8.0 
 
 
-14.0 
 
 
We have revised our forecast for changes in the dwellings deflator in 
2008 and 2009 downwards to -8 per cent in  2008 and -10 per cent 2009. 
Table 3 translates these figures into more widely cited measures of house 
prices, namely the DoEHLG house price measure and the TSB/ESRI 
measure. These figures are broadly consistent with monthly prices in 
December 2009 at 27 per cent  below the February 2007 peak in nominal 
terms. 
 
For non-residential investment, we are forecasting investment in other 
building and construction (excluding transaction costs) to record zero per 
cent growth in 2008, this includes a growth of 8 per cent in public 
investment projects and a 7 per cent decline in investment from the 
commercial and retail sectors. For 2009 we are forecasting commercial and 
retail investment  to contract by 35 per cent, partly due to the more general 
slowdown in the economy and partly due to the specific credit problems 
facing the commercial and retail sector. In relation to public investment, we  
have assumed a growth in volume terms in 2009 of 10 per cent. With the 
Budget 2009 figures for capital investment including a nominal fall of 5 per 
cent in investment expenditures, this figure implies a fall in prices of over 
10 per cent. This is in line with the general fall in prices in this sector 
forecast for next year: the authorities should now have the possibility to 
negotiate significant savings on NDP-funded projects. 
  
There was very strong growth of 13.5 per cent in machinery and 
equipment investment in 2007, in large part driven by purchases of 
airplanes; excluding investment in transport equipment, the growth rate 
was just 1.2 per cent. For 2008 we expect this to contract by 8 per cent, 
partly due to the base effect of the large investment in transport equipment 
in 2007 and partly due to the general slowdown in economic activity. For 
2009 we expect no increase in volume and a 1 per cent contraction in value.  
 
These figures imply that investment is expected to contract by 18.6 per 
cent in volume terms in 2008, and by 19.3 per cent in 2009. If realised, this 
would mean that the share of investment in GNP would fall sharply from 
31 per cent in 2007 to 20 per cent in 2009. 
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The November exchequer returns show that total tax revenues were 
down almost €6 billion relative to the same period in 2007 and €7.3 billion 
below profile. The collapse in tax revenues has accelerated throughout the 
year as the slowdown in the residential sector has spread more generally to 
other sectors of the economy. Figure 6 shows the change in exchequer 
revenues throughout 2008. Until May receipts of non-capital taxes were 
steady, since then these have also fallen relative to 2007 as the slowdown in 
other sectors of the economy, in particular the slowdown in consumption 
and employment, have led to a more general slump in tax revenues. On the 
basis of these numbers we now expect total exchequer tax revenue to be 
€42 billion, compared with our initial forecast in Winter 2007 of €48.9 
billion. We expect this to fall further in 2009 to €40 billion given our 
forecast of continued falls in consumption, rising unemployment and 
further falls in both residential and non-residential investment. 
Table 4: Public Finances  
        
 2006  
€m 
% 
Change 
2007 % 
Change 
2008 % 
Change 
    2009 
        
Current Revenue 46,145 3.8 47,887 -12.7 41,810 -3.7 40,262
Current Expenditure 37,090 10.3 40,896  10.2 45,063 7.0 48,220
   of which: Voted 32,915 12.3 36,959  10.8 40,943 3.2 42,235
        
Current Surplus 9,055 -22.8 6,991 -146.5  -3,252 144.7 -7,957
        
Capital Receipts 1,871 -24.7 1,408      -1.1 1,392 11.9 1,559
Capital Expenditure 8,662 15.7  10,019 10.0 11,020 -6.9 10,257
   of which: Voted 6,476 18.1  7,650 11.3  8,513 -8.8 7,765
        
Capital Borrowing -6,791 26.6 -8,610 11.8 -9,627  -9.6 -8,698
        
Exchequer Balance 2,264.3  -1,619.2  -12,879.7  -16,655.8
 as % of GNP 1.5   -1.0  -8.1  -11.0
        
General Government 
Balance* 5,327.3  442.8   -12,885.1  -18,246.2
 as % of GDP 3.0  0.2   -6.9  -10.2
        
Gross Debt as % of GDP 24.7  24.8  36.7  47.5
        
Net Debt as % of GDP** 12.5  12.0  24.5  34.1
        
* 2008 and 2009 figures are based on National Accounts estimates. 
**Net of Pensions Fund and Social Insurance Fund. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 Our figures for 2009 make no provision for possible expenditures on recapitalising the 
banks. However, we can assume that these expenditures will be made in such a way to 
ensure no change in the net asset position of the government. 
Government 
Spending 
and Public 
Finances2 
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Figure 6: Cumulative Change in Exchequer Revenues During 2008 
Relative to Same Period in 2007 (€000s) 
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This collapse in tax revenues has led to a very dramatic rise in the 
borrowing requirement. We now estimate that total government borrowing 
will be close to €13 billion in 2008, almost 7 per cent of GDP rising to 
€18.2 billion or 10.2 per cent in 2009. Table 5 shows the composition of 
this deficit. Looking first at tax revenues, we can see that between 2002 and 
2006 the share of taxes in GDP rose from 28.3 per cent to 32 per cent of 
GDP. The source of this increase was almost exclusively due to a rise in the 
importance of capital taxes as a source of revenue, whose share rose from 
1.5 to 4 per cent of GDP. The current collapse of the property market has 
meant that this share has fallen to an estimated 2 per cent in 2008, this is 
likely to fall further to 1.3 per cent in 2009. At the same time taxation 
policy has led to a structural fall in non-capital taxes share of GDP over the 
past ten years. For instance, as discussed in Lane (2008), OECD data for 
2007 show that in relation to net direct taxation, the tax burden on average 
households in Ireland was significantly lower than the OECD average. 
Indeed certain low- and middle-income groups, after taking account of 
cash transfers, were effectively net recipients from the State.3 Effectively 
wind-fall taxes generated during the property boom were used to fund a 
structural reduction in other sources of taxation; this policy has seriously 
exacerbated the deficit facing the authorities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 Lane, P. (2008). Setting a Course for Irish Fiscal Policy, ESRI Budget Perspectives 
Conference. 
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Table 5: Tax Revenue and Expenditure as Per Cent of GDP4 
             
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Tax revenue 31.5 31.5 31.4 29.6 28.3 28.8 30.1 30.5 32.0 31.0 28.5 28.2 
Excluding capital taxes 30.1 29.8 29.4 27.6 26.8 26.5 27.5 27.5 28.0 27.5 26.6 27.0 
Total expenditure 32.2 31.9 29.5 31.5 31.6 31.3 31.4 31.5 31.8 32.9 37.5 40.8 
Current 28.6 26.1 25.0 26.1 26.5 26.7 27.0 27.2 27.2 27.5 31.1 34.8 
Capital 3.6 5.8 4.5 5.4 5.1 4.6 4.4 4.4 4.6 5.4 6.4 6.0 
             
 
Second looking at expenditure, we can see that between 1998 and 2006 
total expenditure as a percentage of GDP was relatively stable at between 
31 and 32 per cent of GDP. It rose by over one percentage point in 2007, 
most of which was due to an acceleration in capital spending. However, 
this figure jumps dramatically in 2008 and 2009, because GDP falls by a 
cumulative 6.4 per cent (2.6 per cent in 2008 and 3.9 per cent in 2009) and 
total expenditure5 rises by a cumulative 16 per cent (10.9 per cent in 2008 
and 4.5 per cent in 2009). Together with the collapse of windfall property 
taxes, this has created a yawning gap between expenditures and revenues.  
 
With the economy facing a relatively prolonged recession with rising 
unemployment and falling consumption it is inevitable that the public 
balance will deteriorate. However, policy choices made at the beginning of 
the decade which led to a structural reduction in the taxation take in the 
economy were effectively masked by the windfall exchequer gains 
generated by the property bubble in the middle of the decade. This meant 
that structural expenditure increases were funded out of an unsustainable 
revenue trajectory. The consequence of these imbalances for the economy 
during the current recession is that the borrowing requirement is rising too 
rapidly to allow for any form of pro-cyclical fiscal policy. Instead over the 
short-term the key priority of the authorities must be to control the growth 
of public spending.  
 
 Exports of goods and services have slowed considerably this year, 
recording an annual volume growth rate of 3.7 per cent in Q2. While the 
Quarterly National Accounts data for Q3 are not yet available, the latest figures 
suggest a further moderation in the second half of the year. According to 
the latest External Trade statistics, the merchandise export volume index 
grew by just 0.9 per cent in the year ending September 2008. Services 
exports slowed dramatically in the first half of the year, growing by just 1.2 
per cent compared to the same period last year. We do not expect any 
significant improvement in this figure in the second half of 2008. 
 
 
4 Tax revenues less expenditure do not sum to the deficit, the difference being non-tax 
revenues on both current and capital side. The revenue and expenditure items here are on 
a national accounts basis. 
5 In these tables we use Budget day figures for exchequer and gross expenditure numbers. 
This includes an implicit assumption that any increase in expenditure demands due to the 
recession will be met by cuts elsewhere so that the authorities will keep within budget for 
2009 as a whole. 
Exports 
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Following a strong performance in the final quarter of 2007, 
merchandise export growth decelerated markedly in the first half of 2008, 
growing by just 1.9 per cent in volume terms in Q2, on an annual average 
basis. In value terms, they contracted by 2.6 per cent, signalling a 
continuation in the trend of falling merchandise export prices in that 
period. The latest External Trade statistics estimate a fall of 3.1 per cent in 
the value of merchandise exports in the year ending September 2008. 
Overall, we expect no volume growth in 2008 and a contraction of 3.5 per 
cent in the value of merchandise exports. However, we expect the recent 
strengthening of the dollar to have an impact on merchandise export prices 
over the coming months. The Wholesale Price Index for manufacturing, a 
leading indicator of export prices, has registered an increase in each of the 
last three months. In October 2008, this index grew by 2.6 per cent, 
compared to the same month last year. As a result, we are now forecasting 
2 per cent growth in the value of merchandise exports next year. We expect 
no growth in volume terms.  
 
2008 has been a disappointing year for services exports, following an 
annual volume growth rate of 11.2 per cent in 2007. According to the 
Quarterly National Accounts, the volume of services exports grew by just 6.3 
per cent in 2008 Q2, on an annual basis. The Balance of Payments figures, 
which provide a breakdown of services exports in value terms, confirm a 
slower pace of growth across all services sectors. In particular, however, 
growth in financial services has moderated significantly, in line with the 
overall global slowdown in this sector. Financial services exports grew by 
just 8.3 per cent in the year ending 2008 Q2, following annual growth of 
23.4 per cent at the same point last year. The pace of growth in computer 
services and trade-related business services has also fallen considerably 
from 2007 levels. Meanwhile, tourism exports grew by just 1.8 per cent. We 
do not expect any recovery in services exports for the remainder of 2008, 
in light of the increasingly pessimistic international outlook. We have 
revised our growth forecast for non-tourism services exports down to just 
1.6 per cent in 2008 (4 per cent in value terms). For 2009 we expect a 
contraction in non-tourism services exports of 1 per cent (0.5 per cent in 
value). The volume of tourism exports is expected to contract by 0.5 per 
cent this year (1 per cent growth in value), and for next year we are 
forecasting a contraction of 1.3 per cent in volume and 1 per cent in value. 
 
With a number of our main trading partners now officially in recession, 
our forecasts for overall export growth this year have been revised 
downward since the Autumn Commentary. We now expect export growth 
this year of just 0.6 per cent in volume, and a contraction of 0.3 per cent in  
value. This will be the slowest pace of export growth in five years. The 
outlook for 2009 is also considerably more bleak than previously 
anticipated, and we expect overall exports to contract by 0.4 per cent in 
volume terms, and to grow by 0.8 per cent in value. However, bearing in 
mind that the international outlook for 2009 remains highly uncertain, we 
do expect a very modest recovery in exports towards the end of next year, 
in line with the expected turnaround in the Euro Area and US economies.  
 
  
Table 6: Exports of Goods and Services   
        
 2006 % Change in 2007 2007 % Change in 2008    2008 % Change in 2009     2009 
           
 €m Volume Value €m Volume Value    €m Volume Value     €m 
           
Merchandise 83,235 3.7 1.3 84,300 0.0 -3.5 81,350 0.0  2.0 82,976 
Tourism 4,258  1.0    3.9 4,426 -0.5  1.0 4,470 -1.3 -1.0 4,426 
Other Services 52,811 12.1 15.9 61,224 1.6  4.0 63,673 -1.0 -0.5 63,355 
           
Exports of Goods  
  and Services 140,304 6.8 6.9 149,950 0.6 -0.3 149,493 -0.4 0.8 150,757 
           
FISIM Adjustment 1,359    1,440   1,494   1,487 
           
Adjusted Exports 141,663 6.8 6.9 151,390 0.6 -0.3 150,987 -0.4 0.8 152,243 
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 Figure 7: Exports and Imports Volume Growth Rates (Year-on-Year) 
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Box: Competitiveness 
 
Ireland has enjoyed a period of remarkable economic growth, beginning in 
the early 1990s. Inward FDI flows and strong international demand growth 
fostered a robust export performance during that decade. In more recent 
years, the composition of Irish economic growth shifted away from export-
led growth, to a situation in which domestic sectors drive the economy. 
  
This phase of domestic-led growth has masked an underlying 
deterioration in the competitiveness of the economy. Figure A displays the 
nominal and real Harmonised Competitiveness Indicators for Ireland, and 
shows that the economy has become steadily less competitive since 2001.6 
The Nominal HCI isolates the effect of exchange rate movements and 
takes a weighted average of the bilateral exchange rates with 56 important 
trading partners. The Real HCI is deflated by consumer prices, and so it 
takes into account changes in domestic inflation relative to price changes in 
our trading partners. While both series show a decline in Irish 
competitiveness over the last eight years, the sharp deterioration from mid-
2007 into early 2008 appears to have been offset in recent months. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 An increase in the HCI figure indicates a deterioration in competitiveness.  
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Figure A: Harmonised Competitiveness Indicators 
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Ireland’s primary trading partners outside of the Euro Area are the US 
and the UK, together accounting for 35 per cent of Irish exports in 2007. 
As a result, the performance of the euro relative to the dollar and sterling 
plays a vital role in determining the price competitiveness of the Irish 
economy. Figure B shows that the euro has appreciated quite significantly 
over the last eight years, with respect to both currencies. In particular, the 
euro has made strong gains against sterling and the dollar since early 2007, 
although the latter has regained momentum in recent months. At its peak 
in July 2008, the euro was trading at $1.58,7 representing a 21 per cent 
appreciation in value from its January 2007 level. The euro recently reached 
a record high against sterling, trading at an average of £0.83 last month – a 
25 per cent appreciation from the January 2007 level. This is a very 
significant movement, and presents serious implications for Irish exporters 
whose principal market is the UK.  
Figure B: Bilateral Exchange Rates 
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7 Monthly average for July 2008. 
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Figure C displays trade-weighted exchange rates for Ireland, the UK and 
the USA. The trade-weighted exchange rate provides a more 
comprehensive view of the price competitiveness of exports, as it measures 
the average price of a domestic good relative to the average price of goods 
of trading partners, using the share of trade with each country as the weight 
for that country. An appreciation in this exchange rate results in domestic 
goods and services becoming less price competitive on world markets, 
compared to those produced by its trading partners. Figure C indicates that 
Ireland’s trade-weighted exchange rate appreciated significantly from 2002 
to mid-2008. Over the same period, the trade-weighted exchange rates of 
the UK and the US remained relatively stable.  
Figure C: Trade Weighted Exchange Rates 
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Source: Bank for International Settlements (BIS). 
 
 Imports of goods and services also slowed considerably in the first half of 
2008, contracting by 0.2 per cent in volume terms compared to the first 
two quarters of 2007. The volume of merchandise imports contracted by 
6.8 per cent over the same period, and the latest External Trade figures 
suggest a further contraction in the second half of the year. The 
merchandise import volume index contracted by 3.6 per cent in the year 
ending September 2008. The volume of services imports grew by 6 per cent 
in Q2 on an annual average basis, while in value terms they grew by 8.8 per 
cent. Growth in the value of tourism imports remained particularly strong, 
estimated at 17 per cent in Q2. 
 
Merchandise imports contracted sharply in the first half of 2008, 
consistent with the lower levels of consumption growth and expenditure 
on machinery and equipment. The value of merchandise imports 
contracted by 0.2 per cent in Q2 on an annual basis. The latest External 
Trade statistics indicate that annual growth in the value of food and 
beverage imports has fallen quite significantly from 2007 levels. In the year 
ending August 2008, value growth in food imports was 7 per cent, while 
the value of beverage imports contracted by 2.2 per cent. Imports of 
petroleum products increased by 30 per cent in value over the same period, 
although we would expect this to decrease in the coming months, as oil  
Imports 
  
Table 7: Imports of Goods and Services    
        
 2006  % Change in 2007 2007 % Change in 2008 2008 % Change in 2009      2009 
           
 €m Volume Value      €m Volume Value €m Volume Value    €m 
           
Merchandise 58,203 4.1 6.2 61,840 -3.5 -4.0 59,366 -4.0 -4.5 56,695 
Tourism 5,446  15.0  17.3 6,389 2.5  4.0 6,645 -0.5 0.0 6,645 
Other Services 58,421 3.0 6.3 62,130  -2.3  -0.5 61,819 -3.3 -2.5 60,274 
           
Imports of Goods  
  and Services 122,070 4.1 6.8 130,359 -2.7 -1.9 127,830 -3.5 -3.3 123,613 
           
FISIM Adjustment 557    658   659   644 
           
Adjusted Imports 122,627 4.1 6.8 131,017 -2.7 -1.9 128,490 -3.5 -3.3 124,258 
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prices have dropped considerably from their peak earlier this year. The total 
value of merchandise imports is estimated to have fallen by 4.3 per cent in 
the year ending September 2008. We now expect the volume of 
merchandise imports to contract by 3.5 per cent this year, and by 4 per cent 
next year. In value terms, we expect a contraction of 4 per cent this year 
and 4.5 per cent next year. 
 
According to the most recent Balance of Payments statistics, non-tourism 
services imports grew by 8 per cent in value terms in the year ending 2008 
Q2. Annual growth in the value of tourism imports was 17 per cent in Q2, 
although we expect this to moderate significantly in the second half of the 
year, in line with our forecast for a sharp fall in private consumption. 
Overall we expect tourism imports to grow by 2.5 per cent in volume this 
year, and by 4 per cent in value. We are forecasting a 0.5 per cent 
contraction in the volume of tourism imports next year, and zero growth in 
value. We now expect non-tourism services exports to contract by 2.3 per 
cent this year in volume terms, and by 0.5 per cent in value. In 2009, we 
expect a further contraction of 3.3 per cent and 2.5 per cent in volume and 
value respectively. 
 
We have cut our overall import growth forecast for 2008 and 2009, 
consistent with our expectations for consumption and investment growth 
in both years. We now expect the volume of imports to contract by 2.7 per 
cent this year and by 3.5 per cent next year. In value terms, we are 
forecasting a contraction of 1.9 per cent this year and 3.3 per cent next 
year. 
 
  Our projections for merchandise exports and imports imply a 
contraction of 2.1 per cent in the merchandise trade surplus in 2008, 
followed by a widening of almost 20 per cent in 2009. This is an 
improvement from the estimated contraction of over 10 per cent in 2007, 
although the figures show that the slower pace of contraction this year is 
the result of a dramatic downturn in imports, rather than a stronger export 
performance. A similar pattern is emerging in the services trade balance, 
and the significant slowdown in services imports this year is expected to 
result in a considerable narrowing of the trade deficit. We expect the 
decline in imports to result in a surplus in services trade next year, the first 
such surplus since 1982. We estimate a total trade balance of 13.7 per cent 
of GNP this year, and 18 per cent of GNP next year. 
 
In relation to net factor flows, the latest Balance of Payments data estimate 
that the net factor income deficit widened by 1.3 per cent in the year 
ending 2008 Q2, while total debit flows increased by 8.2 per cent. Direct 
investment income is estimated to have grown by 12.1 per cent, while 
portfolio and other investment income grew by 10.6 per cent, resulting in 
total credit flow growth of 10.7 per cent. The net factor income deficit 
increased by over 19 per cent in 2007. We expect the deficit to decrease by 
7.6 per cent this year, but to grow by 1.5 per cent next year. The effective 
current account balance is expected to narrow this year and next, to -3.6 
per cent of GNP in 2008 and -0.4 per cent of GNP in 2009. 
 
 
Balance of 
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Table 8: Balance of Payments*  
        
 2006 Change 2007 Change 2008 Change 2009 
 €m % €m % €m % €m 
        
Merchandise Trade  Balance 25,032 -10.3 22,460 -2.10 21,983 19.6 26,282 
Service Trade Balance -6,798 -57.8 -2,869 -88.8  -321 -3,68.7 862 
 
Trade Balance in Goods and 
Services on BoP basis 18,234  7.4 19,591  10.6 21,662 25.3 27,143 
% of GNP 12.0  12.2  13.7  18.0 
 Total Debit Flows 90,114 23.8 111,566  1.7 113,511 -3.5 109,565 
 Total Credit Flows 66,086 25.5 82,957 5.0 87,084 -5.0   82,730 
Net Factor Flows  -24,028  19.1 -28,609 -7.6 -26,427 -1.5 -26,835 
Net Current Transfers  -504  -1,283  -1,283  -1,283 
 
Balance on Current Account -6,298  -10,301  -6,047  -974 
        
Capital Transfers 223  62  300  300 
Effective Current Balance  -6,075  -10,239  -5,747  -674 
% of GNP -4.0  -6.4  -3.6  -0.4 
      
* This table includes adjustments to Balance of Payments basis. 
 Our figures imply a fall in output and income in both 2008 and 2009. 
Gross National Disposable Income is a more appropriate measure of a 
country’s overall level of income than GNP since it also includes changes 
in the terms of trade and net international transfers. Our forecasts for 2008 
imply a deterioration in the terms of trade so that while GNP falls by 2.6 
per cent GNDI falls by 4.2 per cent. However in 2009, given current 
forecasts that the dollar will continue to rise in value, we are forecasting an 
improvement in the terms of trade so that the fall in GNDI of -3.6 per cent 
is lower than the fall in GNP of -4.6 per cent. GNP per capita, which 
adjusts for increases in the population size largely driven by inward 
migration, indicates a fall of 4.5 per cent in 2008 and of 4.3 per cent in 
2009.  
 
The most recent national accounts data suggest that in 2007 the external 
sector made its largest contribution to the overall growth rate since 2002. 
Our forecasts for 2008 and 2009 suggest that the recession will be entirely 
driven by domestic demand. The shrinking of the domestic sector is shown 
in Table 9, which shows that the investment to GNP ratio plummets from 
31 per cent in 2007 to just 20 per cent in 2009. As shown in Figure 8 the 
external sector is forecast to add to the overall growth rate in both 2008 
and 2009. However, it is important to point out that some of this is due to 
a shrinking in the level of imports, reflecting the stagnation in consumption 
and sharp contraction in investment in the economy.  
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Table 9: Measures of Growth 
Growth Indicators 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
            
GNP 8.5 9.5 3.8 2.9 5.9 4.5 5.8 6.3 4.1 -2.6 -4.6 
GNP adjusted for Terms of 
Trade 8.2 8.3 4.9 4.0 4.7 3.7 4.7 5.4 1.6 -4.2 -3.5 
GNDI 7.8 7.8 4.0 4.4 4.4 3.7 4.5 4.8 1.1 -4.2 -3.6 
National Resources 7.3 8.5 3.4 4.2 4.0 3.8 4.5 4.7 1.0 -4.1 -3.6 
GNP per capita (constant 
prices) 7.4 8.1 2.3 1.0 4.2 2.8 3.5 3.7 1.8 -4.5 -4.3 
Consumption per capita 
(constant prices) 7.8 8.2 3.6 2.2 1.4 2.2 4.8 4.4 3.9 -4.0 -3.3 
Investment in Housing/GNP 8.8 9.1 9.7 10.1 11.7 13.4 14.9 14.9 13.7 8.9 5.5 
Investment/GNP 27.2 27.2 26.7 26.4 26.4 28.6 31.4 31.2 31.1 25.1 20.1 
Domestic Demand      4.1 8.7 6.2 3.7 -6.1 -7.0 
            
 
Figure 8: Contributions to Growth8 
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Box: The Flow of Funds and the Balance of Payments 
By John Fitz Gerald 
 
Underlying the latest QEC there are significant changes in the flow of 
funds between sectors in the Irish economy. These flows, in turn, together 
match the balance of payments deficit (surplus). 
  
Figure A below shows the net acquisition of financial assets by key 
sectors over the last decade. Traditionally, the household sector in Ireland 
was a substantial saver and it was a net acquirer of financial assets. 
However, by the late 1990s the rise in investment in housing by the 
household sector reversed this pattern, with households becoming net 
 
8 The growth rates in domestic demand and external demand are weighted by their 
respective share in GDP. Therefore, these two growth rates sum to the overall growth in 
GDP. 
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borrowers to finance their investment in housing. This borrowing reached 
exceptional levels in the period 2003 to 2007. 
Figure A: Net Acquisition of Financial Assets9 
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This borrowing by households was funded directly through mortgages 
from the domestic financial system. In turn, the financial system was not 
able to raise adequate funds domestically and, instead, the net foreign 
liabilities of the banking system rose rapidly in the period to 2007. This 
very rapid rise in the banking system’s net foreign liability, shown in Figure 
B, would not have been possible if Ireland had not been a member of 
EMU. If the borrowing by the banking system had been in a foreign 
currency the dramatic increase in foreign currency risk would have been 
passed on to domestic borrowers as higher interest rates and this, in turn, 
would have choked off the boom in the housing market. (The boom would 
probably have been choked off prematurely around the turn of the 
century.) 
 
This capital inflow through the banking system was the counterpart to 
the rapidly rising balance of payments deficit after 2002. With the 
government sector in close to balance until this year and the company 
sector in steady surplus, the counterpart to the movement in the balance of 
payments was the growth in the household sector borrowing and the 
related change in the banking system’s net external position. 
 
However, the situation in 2008 and 2009 is changing rapidly. By 2009 
the household sector will no longer be a significant net borrower. 
However, there has been a dramatic deterioration in the government’s 
position with it borrowing heavily in 2008 and 2009. In spite of this 
borrowing, the decline in the financing needs of the household sector (and 
 
9 These balances should sum to zero. The difference is due to the statistical discrepancy 
plus differences between Balance of Payments and National Accounts measures before 
2006. 
 29 
 
related decline in investment in housing) will mean that the balance of 
payments deficit will fall rapidly. 
Figure B: Net Foreign Liabilities of the Banking System 
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Because the government sector will fund its borrowing through sales of 
bonds abroad this will cover the balance of payments deficit. In fact the 
government’s deficit will tend to pump some liquidity into the economy. 
With the personal sector no longer a net borrower the banking system will 
find itself not having to borrow abroad (net) to fund household sector 
activities in 2009. Moving into 2010, the household sector could even 
become a net lender. This could even see some repayment by the banks of 
their net foreign borrowing. 
 
For the banks themselves this changed environment is likely to see them 
relying more on internal funding (deposits). While funding of the huge 
existing net foreign liabilities will continue to put them under pressure, at 
least they will not be trying to increase their funding from abroad. By 2010 
this should see some easing in their position. However, because there are 
quite a number of banks this net position may be consistent with rather 
different funding needs for individual banks. As there is no Dublin 
interbank market (because there is no Irish pound) the individual banks will 
still find themselves reliant to a greater or lesser extent on the interbank 
market to smooth their inflow of funds and requirements for finance.  
 
While the net foreign liabilities of the banking system are likely to 
stabilise or even fall over the next two years this will not solve the problem 
of a potential shortage of capital arising from losses through loans 
associated with real estate. The banks will probably still need a substantial 
injection of capital. Failure to do so could see a freezing on domestic credit 
markets. 
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We reported in the last Commentary on recent trends in industry, as detailed 
in the Quarterly National Accounts for Q2 2008. The main story at that time 
was the severe contraction in building and construction, with activity in Q2 
2008, 12.2 per cent lower than the corresponding quarter in 2007. Over the 
same period industry outside of building recorded an increase in output 
volume, of 5.8 per cent.  
 
The latest data from the Industrial Production and Turnover series point to 
activity being flat as opposed to contracting. The volume index for Q3 
2008 was essentially unchanged from that of Q2 2007. Comparing the full 
year ended Q3 2008 with the same period one year earlier, growth of 4.4 
per cent was recorded. This annualised figure is made up, however, of 
divergent patterns across the traditional and modern sectors. While the 
modern sector posted growth of 7.4 per cent in volume, the traditional 
sector contracted by 2.6 per cent. The apparent contraction in the 
traditional sector is more pronounced if we compare Q3 2008 and Q3 
2007. On this basis, a contraction of 6.4 per cent is recorded. 
 
The QNA for Q2 also showed that services were beginning to contract. 
On a quarter-on-quarter basis, the volume of services in total fell, although 
by less than 1 per cent. In proportionate terms, the biggest fall was in 
distribution, transport and communications where a fall of 2.2 per cent 
(quarter-on-quarter) was recorded. “Other services” fell by 0.5 per cent, 
while public administration and defence grew by 0.9 per cent. We can get 
some additional insights into recent trends in services, and in industry, 
from the employment figures in the Quarterly National Household Survey Q3 
2008. In those figures, construction shows the biggest proportionate 
decline in employment, comparing Q3 2008 and Q3 2007, at 9.1 per cent. 
The next biggest proportionate decline is for hotels and restaurants (down 
3.9 per cent or 5,400 employees), followed by “other productive industries” 
(down 3.1 per cent or 9,400 employees). Financial and other business 
services show an employment fall of 0.6 per cent (almost 2,000 employees). 
However, if we compare Q3 2008 and Q2 2008, the fall in employment for 
financial and other business services is more pronounced, at 4,000 job 
losses. 
 
 Looking ahead, the highly recessionary environment which we have set 
out for the demand side of the economy will obviously be reflected on the 
supply side. For 2008, we expect services to contract by 0.6 per cent in 
volume terms and for industry (including building) to contract by 3.7 per 
cent. This figure is largely the result of the on-going contraction in house-
building, with building contracting by 19.7 per cent. For 2009, we expect 
services output volume to fall by 2.1 per cent and industrial (including 
Sectoral 
Output 
 Table 10: GDP by Sector    
        
 2006 % Change 2007 % Change 2008 % Change    2009 
           
 €m Volume Value €m Volume Value €m Volume Value €m 
           
Agriculture 3,812 1.3 10.3 4,206 -2.0 -2.4 4,106 -3.0 -4.5 3,922 
           
Industry: 52,610 7.9 7.2 56,403 -3.7 -6.1 52,971 -5.8 -9.1 48,142 
Other Industry 36,685 11.3 8.2 39,701 2.6  1.0 40,098 0.0 -2.0 39,296 
Building & Construction 15,924 0.1 4.9 16,702 -19.7 -22.9 12,873  -25.0  -31.3 8,846 
           
Services: 99,751 6.7 9.6 109,317 -0.6  1.2 110,590 -2.1 -0.3 110,224 
  
Public Administration & 
 Defence 5,396 2.5 7.4 5,797 2.8 4.5 6,058 -1.5 -1.0 5,998 
  
Distribution, Transport 
 and Communications 25,258 5.8 8.5 27,411 -4.6 -3.4 26,473 -3.4 -3.8 25,458 
  
Other Services 
 (including rent) 69,097 7.4 10.1 76,109 0.6  2.6 78,059 -1.7 0.9 78,768 
           
GDP at Factor Cost  156,173 7.0 8.8 169,927 -1.7 -1.3 167,667 -3.4 -3.2 162,289 
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building) output to fall by 5.8 per cent. Within this figure, we foresee 
building output falling by 25 per cent, as the house-building decline (which 
is expected to continue into 2009) is compounded by a fall in commercial 
building. 
 
For agriculture, a major uncertainty at the time of writing concerns the 
fall-out from the withdrawal of pork products. While there will clearly be a 
one-off hit to the pig industry, and possibly to the government finances via 
a compensation scheme, it is unclear as to whether there will be a long-
term problem in terms of the willingness of consumers internationally to 
buy Irish pork (or other food products). We have not factored in such a 
long-run effect and expect agricultural output to fall by 3 per cent in 
volume terms. 
 
 As with many other elements of the economy, the latest figures on 
employment point to an economy that is slowing down and at an 
accelerating pace. According to the latest Quarterly National Household Survey 
(which relates to Q3 2008), there were 25,200 fewer people at work in Q3 
2008 relative to Q3 2007, a fall of 1.2 per cent. By looking at this same 
comparison (i.e. Qx in year t relative to Qx in year t-1) for the earlier part 
of the year, the astonishing turnaround in the labour market is apparent. In 
Figure 9, we show these figures. Employment in Q1 2008 was 53,800 
higher than in Q1 2007. The corresponding figures in the two quarters 
preceding it were even higher.  
Table 11: Employment and Unemployment  
  
 Annual Averages 000s 
     
 2006   2007   2008     2009 
  
Agriculture 116.0 116.1 119.8 118.0 
Industry 564.4 577.6 541.6 470.6 
Services 1,363.4 1,423.4 1,445.9 1,402.0 
     
Total at Work 2,043.7 2,117.0 2,107.3 1,990.6 
Unemployed 94.8 100.5 135.9 206.9 
  
Labour Force 2,138.5 2,217.5 2,243.1 2,197.5 
Unemployment Rate % 4.4 4.5 6.1 9.4 
Net Migration 71.8 67.3 38.5 -50.0 
   of which: Inward Migration  107.8 109.5 83.8 25.0 
Change in Participation Rate* 1.0 1.2 -0.3 -1.3 
     
* Note: Participation rate measured as share of population aged 15-64 years; based on Q2 
figures as are migration figures. 
 
On a seasonally adjusted basis, the fall in employment between Q2 2008 
and Q3 2008 was 18,900 or 0.9 per cent. Construction accounts for the 
bulk of the decline, with 12,500 fewer people employed in that sector in Q3 
relative to Q2. Comparing Q3 2008 and Q3 2007, job losses in 
construction amount to 25,000. Returning to the Q2/Q3 comparisons, 
financial and other business services posted job losses of 4,000. 
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries showed a similar number of job losses 
over this period but this may be related to how people are reporting their 
Employment 
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employment situations. Between Q2 2007 and Q2 2008, there appeared to 
be an increase of over 7,000 in this sector but it seems reasonable to 
assume that this resulted from some people who were laid-off from 
industry or construction reporting themselves as then being employed in 
agriculture. 
Figure 9: Change in Numbers Employed by Quarter, Relative to the Same 
Quarter One Year Earlier 
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Source: Quarterly National Household Survey, CSO. 
 
Viewing developments in the labour market from the perspective of 
unemployment shows, unsurprisingly, a similar picture. According to the 
QNHS, the rate of unemployment reached a recent low of 4.5 per cent in 
Q4 2007. In Q3 2008, this had risen to 7 per cent. In terms of numbers 
unemployed, the QNHS shows that there were 160,600 people in this 
situation in Q2 2008, up from 101,000 in Q4 2007. While we typically steer 
away from using the Live Register as an indicator of labour market trends, 
the figures from this source are too striking to ignore. In November 2008, 
there were 268,586 on the register, an increase of over 100,000 on 
November 2007. Between October and November, the increase was almost 
17,000 (seasonally adjusted). 
 
Looking ahead, we now expect that total employment will average 2.11 
million in 2008 and that it will fall to 1.99 million  in 2009. This would be a 
fall of 116,700 between the two years or 5.5 per cent. With employment 
contracting to such an extent, there are clearly implications for the rates of 
unemployment and participation and for the pattern and extent of 
migration. Our expectation is that unemployment will average 9.4 per cent 
in 2009 and that net outward migration will be 50,000. Combined with 
these numbers, we expect participation to fall by 1.3 percentage points. We 
would stress that the apportioning of the employment adjustment across 
unemployment, migration and participation is tentative. It could well 
happen that the net outflow will be lower, whereby the rate of 
unemployment would be higher, ceteris paribus. A crucial variable in this 
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context will be economic conditions elsewhere. Given the apparently global 
nature of this recession, it is not clear that significant employment 
opportunities exist elsewhere. However, if the recovery in Ireland was to 
lag the recovery elsewhere, this would have clear implications for the 
direction of migratory flows. 
 
 The most recent data available on earnings relate to Q2 2008. At that 
time, annual wage growth in industry was reported at 4.2 per cent.10 The 
corresponding figure for distribution and services was 3.6 per cent. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the reported annual rate of wage growth in building 
and construction was higher, at 5.1 per cent. Given employment losses in 
that sector, this figure is difficult to interpret although it might be related to 
a composition effect, whereby lower skilled (and hence lower paid) workers 
are the first to be laid off. 
 
The rapidly deteriorating situation in the labour market leads us to 
believe that the pace of earnings growth will have eased considerably and 
may even have gone into reverse. For 2008, we expect that nominal wages 
will rise by 2.6 per cent. For 2009, our forecast is for zero wage growth. 
While all the forecasts in this Commentary are highly uncertain, we should 
stress that arriving at a forecast for nominal wage growth is particularly 
problematic. It is clear that the increases in unemployment will have a 
dampening effect on wages but it is very difficult to assess the speed with 
which wages will adjust to the new reality that is developing in Ireland’s 
labour market. This is a crucially important point because the speed with 
which the labour market adjusts will, to a great extent, determine the speed 
with which the economy can return to a growth path. Our forecast of zero 
per cent nominal growth assumes that the reaction in the labour market is 
reasonably quick. Having seen annual rates of increase in the region of 5 
per cent or better in a number of recent years, a situation of no nominal 
increases in 2009 would be a sharp break from the recent past. 
 
If the zero rate of nominal wage growth happens, this would imply a fall 
of 5.8 per cent in non-agricultural wage income in 2009. However, with 
transfers increasing by 13.9 per cent, as a result of increases announced in 
Budget 2009 and increases in the numbers unemployed, the overall fall in 
gross personal income is lower, at -0.2 per cent. Tax increases from Budget 
2009 imply that personal disposable income will fall by 0.2 per cent. With 
consumption contracting by a larger amount (3.4 per cent in nominal 
terms), the savings rate will rise to 8.6 per cent, up from 5.7 per cent in 
2008 and from 3.8 per cent in 2009.  
 
10 This figure is taken from the CSO’s recently introduced Earnings, Hours and Employment 
Costs Survey. Other figures in this paragraph are taken from their long-established sectoral 
earnings studies. 
Incomes 
  
Table 12: Personal Disposable Income    
        
 2006 Change  2007 Change       2008 Change 2009 
           
     €m % €m €m % €m         €m % €m €m 
           
Agriculture, etc. 3,084  12.1 372 3,456 0.0 0 3,456 -2.0  -69 3,387 
Non-Agricultural Wages 71,900 8.8 6,310 78,211 1.9 1,495 79,705 -5.8 -4,609 75,097 
Other Non-Agricultural Income 14,807 16.8 2,493 17,300 -16.6   -2,877 14,423 9.2 1,325 15,748 
           
Total Income Received 89,792 10.2 9,175 98,966 -1.4 -1,382   97,584 -3.4 -3,353  94,232 
Current Transfers 19,293  2.5 474 19,767  15.0 2,962 22,729 13.9 3,165 25,894 
           
Gross Personal Income 109,084 8.8   9,649 118,733 1.3  1,580 120,313 -0.2 -187 120,126 
Direct Personal Taxes 21,409 10.1 2,152 23,562  -0.5  -108 23,454 0.2  35 23,489 
           
Personal Disposable Income  87,675 8.6 7,497 95,172 1.8 1,688 96,860 -0.2 -223  96,637 
Consumption 83,688  9.4 7,894 91,582  -0.2 -223 91,359 -3.4 -3,069  88,290 
Personal Savings 3,987   3,590   5,501   8,347 
Savings Ratio  4.5   3.8   5.7   8.6 
Average Personal Tax Rate 19.6   19.8   19.5   19.6 
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Box: Public and Private Sector Earnings 
 
By E. Kelly, S. McGuinness and P. O’Connell 
 
Over the last decade, there has been a great deal of discussion about pay 
levels in the public sector in Ireland. Public sector earnings are important. 
They constitute a substantial proportion of overall public expenditure.  
They have an important bearing on recruitment, retention and motivation 
of public servants. They may also influence private sector wage rates, and 
by extension, national competitiveness. At present, public sector employees 
account for about 22 per cent of total employees and expenditure on public 
sector pay amounts to over one-third of total current public expenditure.  
 
Average earnings in the public sector tend to be higher than those in the 
private sector.  For example, data collected by the Central Statistics Office 
(CSO) in the National Employment Survey (NES) in 2006 showed that 
average weekly earnings in the public sector were one-third higher than in 
the private sector. However, such a comparison is not meaningful as it does 
not take account of differences in the composition of the two sectors. On 
average, public sector workers tend to be better qualified and have longer 
work experience than their private sector counterparts. Furthermore, a 
higher proportion of public sector workers are in professional occupations.  
 
In the last decade or so, Ireland has experienced substantial growth in 
earnings across the labour market, although the rate of growth has been 
more rapid in the public sector. The 2006 NES report notes that, overall, 
average weekly earnings increased by almost 20 per cent between March 
2003 and March 2006, with an increase of 27 per cent in the public sector 
and 17 per cent in the private sector.   
 
Wage movements may differ over time between the public and private 
sectors because of differing mechanisms for wage determination in the two 
sectors. Most public sector pay is governed by institutional wage setting 
and public policy, whereas market forces predominately influence 
movements in private sector pay.11 Since mid-2003, there have been several 
rounds of pay increases awarded to public sector workers. In 2002, the first 
report of the Public Sector Benchmarking Body recommended pay increases 
ranging from 2-27 per cent, and averaging 8.9 per cent, for 138 public 
sector grades. The awards were implemented from May 2003 onwards. In 
2005, the Review Body on Higher Remuneration in the Public Sector recommended 
a 7.5 per cent interim salary increase to the senior public sector posts 
within its remit, which had not been covered by Benchmarking. In addition 
to these pay increases that were specific to the public sector, there were 
two general national wage agreements negotiated under the Social Partnership 
process that awarded 7 per cent pay increases in 2004, and 5.5 per cent 
between June 2005 and June 2006. The national wage agreements are 
applied virtually universally across the public sector. However, 
implementation of the national wage deals is patchy across the private 
 
11 Fitz Gerald, J. (1999). “Wage Formation and the Labour Market” in F. Barry (ed.), 
Understanding Ireland’s Economic Growth. London: Macmillan. 
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sector.12 This is because union density is lower in the private sector and, 
consequently, a smaller proportion of the private sector is covered by the 
national pay agreements. Accordingly, the private sector is regarded as 
being more responsive to market forces than to institutional factors, and 
private sector companies negotiate wage settlements either above or below 
the national pay agreement rates.   
 
Analysis of the NES data allows us to assess the extent of the public-
sector wage premium while taking account of differences in the 
composition of the workforces in the two sectors. The analysis shows that, 
controlling for the influence of education, experience, gender, and 
occupation, the public sector pay premium increased from less than 10 per 
cent in 2003 to over 20 per cent in 2006, following the series of pay setting 
rounds in the intervening years.13 It should be noted that the methodology 
used is based on the standard approach in the international literature to the 
comparison of earnings and is similar to that adopted in the econometric 
study of the 2003 NES data prepared for the second Benchmarking report14. 
Furthermore, the earnings information used in the study takes account of 
regular bonuses and commissions. The public sector pay premium was 
found to apply equally to both male and female employees in 2006. In 
addition, the analysis suggests that in 2003 senior public sector officials, 
those at the top of the income distribution, earned less then their 
counterparts in the private sector. However, by 2006, the wage penalty for 
senior public servants had been reversed and replaced by a pay premium in 
excess of 10 per cent. The public sector advantage is even greater for those 
at the lower end of the income distribution, with those in the lowest public 
sector grades earning a premium in excess of 30 per cent compared to their 
private sector counterparts.  
 
It is important to note that these results represent conservative estimates 
of the extent of the differential in compensation between public and 
private sector workers as they take no account of the fact that the vast 
majority of public sector workers are entitled to pensions index-linked to 
wage growth in the public sector. Furthermore, occupational pension 
coverage is much lower in the private sector, and many such pension 
schemes are not linked to wage growth.  In addition, the estimates do not 
take account of the job security enjoyed by public sector workers.  
Since 2006, additional awards were recommended under the Review Body 
on Higher Remuneration in the Public Sector, mainly to senior posts in 2007, 
although implementation of some of these rewards has been deferred. 
 
12 Barrett, A., T. Callan, and B. Nolan (1999). “Rising Wage Inequality, Returns to 
Education and Labour Market Institutions: Evidence from Ireland”, British Journal of 
Industrial Relations., Vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 77-100. 
McGuinness, S., E. Kelly, and P.J. O’Connell (2008). “The Impact of Wage Bargaining 
Regime on Firm-Level Competitiveness and Wage Inequality: The Case of Ireland” ESRI 
Working Paper 266.  
13 Kelly, E., S. McGuinness, and P.J. O’Connell (2008). “Benchmarking, Social Partnership 
and Higher Remuneration: Wage Setting Institutions and the Public-Private Sector Wage 
Gap in Ireland”,  ESRI Working Paper 268. 
14 Ernst & Young and A. Murphy (2007). “An Econometric Study of Earnings Based on 
National Employment Survey 2003 Data”. 
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Moreover, a number of additional awards are pending. The second 
Benchmarking report has recommended awards ranging from 1-15 per 
cent, mainly for senior public sector grades, although for the vast majority 
of grades no increase was recommended. Under the most recent Social 
Partnership pay agreement, increases of 5.5 per cent to 6 per cent across 
both public and private sectors have been agreed over the October 2008 to 
June 2010 period, with implementation scheduled to begin in September 
2009.  
 
The extent of the discrepancy between public and private sector pay in 
Ireland is far higher than in many other countries: the pay gap rarely 
exceeds 10 per cent in European countries.15 This differential would be 
difficult to justify in normal economic circumstances. The current context 
of economic recession, with falling employment, growing unemployment 
and a crisis in the public finances, suggests that the public sector pay 
premium should come on the agenda for discussion with the Social 
Partners as a matter of urgency.  
 
 The Consumer Price Index increased by 2.5 per cent in November 2008, 
compared to November 2007. This is the lowest year-on-year increase in 
the CPI in 2008 so far, and is down significantly on the previous month’s 
increase of 4 per cent. The twelve month moving average inflation rate fell 
to 4.4 per cent in the year ending November 2008, and we expect a further 
decline over the coming months, as inflationary pressures continue to ease.  
Figure 10: CPI Inflation Rate 
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Source: Consumer Price Index, CSO. 
 
Much of the volatility in the CPI throughout 2008 has been a result of 
fluctuations in international commodity markets, and their effect on the 
 
15 Lucifora, C., and Meurs, D., (2006) “The Public Sector Pay gap in France, Greta Britain, 
and Italy” Review of Income and Wealth, 52 (1): 43-59. 
Consumer 
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prices of food and oil-related products. The pace of food price inflation 
peaked in March, increasing by 9.6 per cent compared to March 2007, but 
has been falling since then and was estimated at 3.9 per cent in November. 
Oil prices reached record highs in July, and the price of home-heating oil in 
that month was 50 per cent higher than in July 2007, while petrol and diesel 
prices recorded increases of 12 per cent and 32 per cent respectively in that 
period. However, the price of oil on international markets has fallen by 
over 60 per cent from that peak and some of this fall has begun to feed 
through to consumer prices. In November, there were year-on-year 
decreases in petrol, diesel and home-heating oil of 6.6 per cent, 4.5 per cent 
and 6.7 per cent respectively.  
 
The contribution of the mortgage interest component to overall CPI 
inflation fell by over 10 per cent in November compared to the previous 
month, and this is likely to be a reflection of the October interest rate cut 
by the European Central Bank. The mortgage interest component 
accounted for 18 per cent of the increase in the CPI between November 
2007 and November 2008. We would expect to see a further reduction in 
the mortgage interest component over the coming months, as the effects of 
the substantial interest rate reductions by the ECB in November and 
December begin to feed through. In addition to this, the average home 
purchase loan interest rate charged during October fell by 18 basis points 
compared to September, according to figures from the CSO. This follows 
substantial increases in this rate earlier in the year, as lenders responded to 
the higher rates they faced on the inter-bank lending markets. 
 
Clothing and footwear prices fell by a substantial 7.2 per cent in 
November compared to the same month last year, and this is the fastest 
pace of decline in almost six years. With sterling falling quite rapidly against 
the euro in recent months, we would expect to see some of this 
depreciation reflected in consumer prices here.  
 
Using the EU Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP)16 
Ireland’s inflation rate averaged 3.3 per cent in Ireland for the twelve 
months ending November 2008. The HICP does not include mortgage 
interest, and as a result it is not as sensitive to movements in the ECB main 
refinancing rate as the CPI. Our forecast for HICP inflation in Ireland this 
year is 3.2 per cent, and we expect this to moderate quite significantly in 
2009, averaging 0.5 per cent on an annual basis, in line with the moderation 
in food and oil prices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 The HICP excludes mortgage interest, building materials, concrete blocks, union 
subscriptions, motor car insurance, dwellings insurance, motor car tax and motorcycle tax. 
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Table13: Inflation Measures (%) 
        
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
CPI 3.5 2.2 2.4 3.9 4.9 4.1 -2.0 
Mortgage Interest -8.3 5.4 12.3 31.4 40.4 15.1 -33.2 
HICP (Ireland) 4.0 2.3 2.2 2.7 2.9 3.2 0.5 
HICP (Euro Area) 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.1 3.0 1.4 
        
 
Figure 11: Inflation Profile 2007 - 2009 (Forecast 2008M11 Onwards) 
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We expect CPI inflation to average 4.2 per cent in 2008. Our forecast 
for 2009 is heavily dependent on our assumptions regarding ECB interest 
rate decisions. While the Governing Council has cut the main refinancing 
rate by a massive 1.75 per cent over the last three months, the deepening 
recession in the Euro Area and the absence of medium-term inflationary 
risks mean that future rate cuts are likely. As such, we are assuming a 
further 50 basis point cut in the main refinancing rate to 2 per cent by mid-
2009. We assume that this rate cut, along with recent rate cuts, will be fully 
passed on by mortgage lenders. Combined with the collapse in commodity 
prices, we are now forecasting deflation of 2 per cent for 2009. However, if 
the ECB decides to take a more aggressive monetary policy approach than 
is assumed in this analysis, we could see CPI inflation slipping even further. 
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GENERAL ASSESSMENT 
The forecasts contained in this Commentary show clearly that the economy 
is currently experiencing severe difficulties and that these difficulties will 
persist well into 2009 and perhaps beyond. The sources of the difficulties 
are well known. The global economy is experiencing a dramatic downturn 
and Ireland is being affected. Export markets are shrinking and both 
consumer and business sentiment are suffering. In addition, Ireland is also 
going through a contraction in house-building, the result of which is to 
make the downturn here steeper than elsewhere. The effects of the 
downturn are rapidly becoming very real, for example, in terms of job 
losses. The rate of increase in the Live Register is at historic highs, with 
over 100,000 people being added in the year ended November 2008. While 
we do not, as yet, have official data on migration flows since April of this 
year, it seems highly likely that net outflows have either resumed or will 
resume soon. 
 
An additional feature of the economy as we look into 2009 is the 
prospect of negative price inflation. Clearly, this is something which has 
not formed a part of our analysis in recent memory. However, the 
implications are potentially numerous and thought needs to be given to 
them in policy formulation. One point that should be stressed is that many 
of the problems associated with negative inflation only arise if on-going 
price falls begin to be embedded in peoples’ expectations. It is in such a 
context that the term “deflation” is more generally applied. If negative 
inflation becomes embedded in the expectations of consumers, there is an 
incentive to postpone purchases, thereby further depressing consumption 
spending. From the perspective of borrowers, be they households or 
businesses, expectations of continued price falls lead to an increase in the 
perceived real interest rate, with implications for the cost of borrowing. 
 
Deflation of this type is both highly unusual and highly problematic 
from an economic perspective. However, if it is the case that a period of 
negative inflation is short-lived and does not become embedded in 
expectations, it can be positive in terms of raising the real vale of nominal 
incomes. In this context, it allows for real increases in wages and welfare 
payments even without nominal  wage increases. 
 
Returning to the broader problems facing the economy, although the 
situation is both poor and deteriorating, it needs to be pointed out that the 
policy tools available to the government are very limited. For example, 
while the recapitalisation of the banks with public money may be necessary 
for the long-run health of the economy, it may not lead to any immediate 
rebound in bank lending. In recessionary times, bank lending tends to be 
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curtailed regardless of the financial health of the banks at the outset of the 
downturn. Almost by definition, a recession implies an increased risk of 
bankruptcies for businesses and households. Without perfect information 
on who are good risks and who are bad risks, banks will tend to be more 
conservative in general when lending. Hence, lending is likely to be 
constrained in 2009, even with recapitalisation.  
 
The possible use of a fiscal stimulus has been proposed as another anti-
recession policy tool but we see no scope for such a move. With the 
general government deficit forecast by us to increase from 6.9 per cent of 
GDP in 2008 to 10.2 per cent in 2009, we cannot see the scope for this. 
For us, this movement in the public finances is a source of concern 
because it represents a possible constraint on our ability to emerge from 
the current problems. On the basis of our forecasts, the general 
government debt will have risen from 24.8 per cent of GDP in 2007 to 
47.5 per cent at the end of 2009. This debt level in itself is not a concern 
but the speed with which the debt is increasing is a big concern.  
 
In order to ensure that mounting public debt does not act as a 
constraint on future growth, as it did in the 1980s, there is now an 
immediate need to start the multi-annual process of bringing the public 
finances back onto a sustainable path. In this context, it now seems clear to 
us that it will be difficult for the government to pay the 3.5 per cent due on 
September 1 2009 under the terms of Towards 2016. There is a need to re-
open negotiations on the partnership agreement and for all sides to take 
account of the drastically changed circumstances facing the economy.  
 
We believe that a strong case can be made for the possibility of nominal 
wage cuts in the public sector being considered. With tax revenues 
plummeting, the state’s ability to pay its public servants at existing rates 
may not be sustainable. If choices have to be made between reduced 
numbers, and hence levels of service, or lower rates of pay, the latter would 
surely be preferred by many. In addition, the speed with which the public 
finances are deteriorating is such that a pay-based approach offers an 
approach through which savings can be realised more quickly, relative to an 
approach based on job reductions. 
 
New research, presented in the box above on the public/private wage 
differential, suggests that there is a significant pay advantage for those 
working in the public sector and that this may have increased in recent 
years. Given this, it seems highly unlikely that any wage reductions in the 
public sector would, in general, lead to any significant challenges in terms 
of retaining or recruiting staff. 
 
It should be stressed that a moderation in public sector pay will not be 
sufficient to restore balance to the public finances. Expenditure cuts will 
still be needed. Ideally, these should be achieved through the elimination of 
waste and inefficiencies and through the cancellation of capital projects 
with low rates of return. While tax increases would not be desirable at this 
point in time, it is likely that such increases will be needed in the medium 
term. As discussed in out last Commentary, the ending of the property boom 
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brought with it an erosion in elements of the tax base which will not return. 
In order to sustain desired levels of public spending, extra revenues will 
need to be found. 
 
Ireland will only return to a path of growth when (a) a global upturn 
begins and (b) if Ireland is able to compete in world markets. Only at that 
point can we see consumer and business confidence lifting. The 
international forecasts used in this Commentary see a very modest upturn 
beginning in the middle of 2009, although with output remaining below 
trend into 2010. Our hope would be that wages, and other prices, adjust 
rapidly in Ireland so that Ireland does participate in the global upturn. This 
would imply a re-emergence of positive growth in 2010, although at a low 
level. We remain concerned that a failure to bring order back to the public 
finances will act as a drag on growth. This could happen if the burden of 
interest payments continues to rise, if an increasing debt leads consumers 
to expect future tax increases above what might otherwise be needed and if 
investors interpret mounting deficits as a negative signal for the quality of 
governance. These scenarios need to be avoided so that Ireland’s lost 
decade of the 1980s is not repeated. 
 
As in previous Commentaries, it is useful to stress the on-going 
importance of active labour market policy and competition policy. ESRI 
research from the 1990s demonstrated very clearly how important it was to 
keep the unemployed close to the workplace, through training and 
employment programmes that were closely related to labour market needs. 
In the context of unemployment, one issue which will return to the 
national agenda soon is the relationship between wages and unemployment 
benefits and assistance. With wages likely to be depressed in the coming 
years, on-going increases in welfare payments would result in an increase in 
replacement rates, with implications for incentives to move between 
welfare and work. This issue will need careful consideration when Budget 
2010 is being prepared and when a review of the national minimum wage is 
conducted. Finally, efforts should continue to ensure that competition 
policy is used to the fullest extent possible, to remove any barriers to entry 
in areas such as retail. Competitiveness will be aided through such moves 
and this is the key requirement of policy at present. 
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 It is widely believed that survey-based confidence indicators provide a reasonably accurate 
picture of economic conditions. This paper examines whether data from the business and 
consumer surveys conducted for the European Commission might be useful for short-term 
macroeconomic forecasting. First, the internal consistency of the survey data is tested, to 
ascertain the extent to which reported outcomes from one month correspond to 
expectations data from previous months. The forecasting potential is then explored by 
comparing the survey data to their official data equivalents. The results from this analysis 
are mixed and suggest that the potential of the business survey data is limited. From 
these surveys only four variables produced findings that merit further investigation. The 
results from the consumer survey were more positive, and suggest that a number of 
statistical relationships exist between the survey series and the official data.
Abstract 
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Until April 2008, a number of regular surveys of households and 
enterprises were conducted for the European Commission, using methods 
that were coordinated across the EU so that comparable data was collected. 
The data were used by the Commission to generate indicators for Irish 
economic activity and as an input into indicators for the EU and Euro 
Area. Five surveys were conducted on a monthly basis: Consumer, 
Construction, Industry, Retail, and Services. The data from these surveys 
provided information on the conditions in each sector of the economy, and 
also on expectations about future performances. The results of the survey 
for a given month were usually available by the final week of the month 
following, and this timeliness ensures that surveys of this nature have a 
valuable information lead advantage over other sources of data, which 
typically have much lengthier publication lags. As such, their most obvious 
use is an input for macroeconomic forecasting. In spite of this, however, 
little use has been made of survey data for the purpose of forecasting, and 
there has not been extensive analysis of their potential predictive power. 
1. 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a preliminary assessment of the 
potential usefulness of this type of survey for macroeconomic forecasting. 
Output and employment are assumed to be the forecasting priorities, and 
so the focus of this analysis will be these two variables. This assessment will 
consist of two stages: First, the internal consistency of the survey data will 
be checked. This procedure tests the extent to which survey predictions in 
one month forecast the results of following surveys. The results of this 
analysis are discussed in Section 5. In Section 6, an assessment of the 
comparability of the survey series with equivalent Central Statistics Office 
(CSO) series is undertaken. This test of external consistency demonstrates 
how capable the survey data are of tracking movements in the official 
statistics. Prior to running this series of testing procedures, a review of 
some of the relevant literature is provided in Section 2, as well as a brief 
history of the surveys in question in Section 3. Section 4 gives a brief 
description of the data. 
 
 Within Ireland, the industry component of the European Commission 
surveys has previously been assessed at a preliminary level. Kearney (1991) 
examined both the internal consistency of the industrial survey series and 
its comparability with equivalent quantitative statistics. A similar study was 
conducted by Merriman and O’Reardon (1995). Both of these papers 
presented reasonably positive results. The industrial survey data were 
shown to possess a satisfactory level of internal consistency. The results 
reported in both of these papers also suggest that statistical relationships 
exist between a number of the survey variables and their equivalent official 
statistics, although these relationships are arguably quite weak. This paper 
will re-examine the work of Kearney (1991) and Merriman and O’Reardon 
(1995), and extend their analysis to include the other three business 
surveys, and the consumer survey.  
2.  
Literature 
Review 
 
A number of studies have been conducted outside of Ireland using 
survey response data. Hüfner and Schröder (2002) analyse four economic 
sentiment indicators for Germany – the Ifo Business Climate Index (IFO), 
the European Commission’s Economic Sentiment Indicator for Germany 
(ESIN), the Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) and the ZEW Indicator of 
Economic Sentiment (ZEW). They test the forecasting capabilities of these 
indicators using the year-on-year growth rate of industrial production as a 
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reference. The results reveal that the IFO, PMI and ZEW all lead the 
growth rate of industrial production by five months, and as such, may be 
useful forecasting tools. 
 
Brunco and Malgarini (2002) examined whether fluctuations in Italian 
economic activity might be predicted using indicators that gather 
information from business and household surveys. Using a dynamic factor 
model, they constructed a separate indicator for the manufacturing, 
construction and retail sectors, and also for household consumption. These 
indicators were then tested to evaluate their capacity to forecast the main 
cyclical features of a particular reference series. The indicator for the 
manufacturing sector was found to track industrial production reasonably 
well, and the indicator for household consumption also produced 
satisfactory results. The retail trade and construction sector indicators were 
found to be very poor predictors of retail sales and investment in 
production respectively.  
 
The Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic (2005) also obtained 
successful results from industry survey data. It examined the relationship 
between the monthly industrial production index and lagged survey 
responses regarding expectations of output, and found a good degree of 
correlation. It also carried out an analysis of the construction and retail 
sectors, and while expectations regarding future construction activity were 
found to have a positive relationship with official output in the 
construction sector, no relationship existed between official retail sales and 
prior expectations about future retail trade receipts. 
 
Santero and Westerlund (1996) explore the forecasting potential of 
business and consumer survey data in a number of countries.1  First, they 
examine the cross-correlation coefficients of business and consumer 
confidence indicators with selected macroeconomic variables. These 
include two measures of output – GDP and industrial production, and two 
demand components – real business investment and real private 
consumption. They found that the US, Japan, France, Spain and Belgium 
showed high correlations of business confidence with both measures of 
output and with investment. In the UK and Canada, business sentiment is 
well correlated with both measures of output, but not with investment. The 
results for Germany suggest that business sentiment is very closely related 
with industrial production, but less so with GDP and investment. The 
consumer confidence indicators were not shown to have strong 
correlations, irrespective of the variable examined.  
 
The literature on consumer sentiment and its forecasting capabilities is 
dominated by studies of the United States. Chopin and Darrat (2000) focus 
on the issue of whether or not consumer attitudes can forecast the 
macroeconomy in the United States, and they examine the relationship 
between The Conference Board’s Index of Consumer Confidence2  and 
several macro variables. They emphasise the idea that if changes in 
consumer attitude precede changes in consumer behaviour, then 
knowledge of these attitudes could help explain consumer spending and 
 
1 United States; Japan; Germany; France; Italy; United Kingdom; Canada; Belgium; 
Denmark; Netherlands; Spain. 
2 See www.conference-board.org. The Consumer Confidence Survey is based on a 
representative sample of 5,000 US households. 
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saving patterns. The authors use a flexible lag structure and a multivariate 
vector error correction model (VECM) to investigate the Granger-causal 
relationships among consumer attitudes and several macro variables, 
including retail sales, personal disposable income, inflation, stock prices 
and interest rates. The evidence that emerges suggests that the ICC can 
predict movements in personal disposable income, interest rates, and to 
some extent, also the DOW Jones Industrial Average. However, the ICC 
proves an unreliable predictor for retail sales or inflation. 
 
Pain and Weale (2001) examine the information content of consumer 
surveys in the UK and the United States. The UK measure they use comes 
from the European Commission, and is also used by the OECD. The 
indicator combines replies to five separate survey questions relating to the 
current and expected financial condition of the household, the current and 
expected general economic situation and whether respondents are planning 
to make major purchases. The US index is the consumer sentiment 
indicator that has been compiled by the Survey Research Centre of the 
University of Michigan since 1952. The questions cover similar issues to 
those in the UK, relating to current and expected trends in personal 
finances and business conditions, and current buying conditions for 
durable goods. The authors run simple dynamic regressions of the growth 
in consumers’ expenditure in the current quarter on lagged expenditure 
growth and current and lagged survey responses. In both countries, the 
results show that current surveys are significantly positively correlated with 
current expenditure. Periods of consumer optimism coincide with periods 
of comparatively high expenditure growth. 
 
These empirical findings suggest that the potential use of business and 
household surveys as a forecasting tool is worth investigating. In particular, 
the literature highlights the success of industry and consumer survey data. 
While not all the results are positive, there certainly seems to be a 
consensus regarding the capability, albeit limited, of certain survey series to 
track official statistics on output and employment.  
 
 
3.  
History of 
the European 
Commission 
Activity/ 
Sentiment 
3.1   INDUSTRY SURVEY 
This survey was established in Ireland in the early 1970s, post-EU 
membership, with IBEC as the main contractor at the time. Sectoral 
coverage for the survey was specified by the Commission, i.e. NACE 15-
36. The sample was based on a panel of 650 firms. Approximately 250 
questionnaires were returned monthly, representing a response rate of the 
order of 38 per cent. The data from the industry survey were re-weighted 
prior to sending results to the Commission. A total of 3 weights were 
derived for each round of the survey, based on sectoral turnover, 
employment and export levels. The population parameters upon which the 
weighting system was built were derived from the annual Census of 
Industrial Production produced by the CSO.  
3.2   CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY SURVEY 
This survey started in the 1970s and was originally undertaken by the 
Construction Industry Federation (CIF). The sample for the construction 
survey was selected from lists prepared by the CIF, which contained all the 
main agents in the sector in Ireland. Selection was on a disproportionate 
stratified basis, ensuring that the largest possible share of the value of 
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construction work was captured. Approximately 80 forms were returned 
monthly and enhanced numbers were surveyed quarterly, generating 
around 130 responses. Re-weighting of the data was based on the value of 
business according to the following activities: site preparation; civil 
engineering; building installation; building completion; and renting of plant 
and machinery. 
3.3   SERVICES SECTOR SURVEY 
This survey was started in 1996. The sample was generated from 
population lists of businesses throughout Ireland, and the population 
parameters were devised from the Annual Services Enquiry, produced by 
the CSO. Approximately 230 questionnaires were returned monthly. The 
data were re-weighted using a ratio-weighting scheme based on number of 
enterprises within sector/size strata and the total number of employees 
within the same sector.  
3.4   RETAIL SECTOR SURVEY 
As with the services survey, this survey was started in 1996. The sample 
was generated from population lists of businesses throughout Ireland, and 
sectoral coverage was in the six broad sectors as requested by the 
Commission: food, beverages and tobacco; textiles, clothing and footwear; 
household electrical goods; household non-electrical goods; motor vehicles; 
large multiples; and remaining retail trade. Approximately 260 forms were 
returned monthly.  
3.5   CONSUMER SURVEY 
As an input to the EU-wide Consumer Survey, the ESRI conducted a 
nationally representative survey of households on a monthly basis. The 
primary objective of the survey was to record details on consumers’ 
attitudes towards trends in the economy. A fresh national sample was used 
each month, and this sample is representative of the totality of persons 
living in private households in Ireland. The questions were based on four 
main themes – the general economic situation, their personal financial 
situation and capacity to save, intentions with regard to the purchase of 
durable consumer goods and housing intentions. At present, the monthly 
KBC Ireland/ESRI Consumer Sentiment Index is constructed using the 
responses to five of the questions that originally formed part of the 
Consumer Survey. The Consumer Sentiment Index uses the same 
methodology that is employed by the University of Michigan.3   
 
 The data for this analysis are taken from the five monthly surveys 
discussed above. The business surveys cover a variety of aspects of the 
company’s operations, such as output, employment, exports, stocks and 
prices. The consumer survey asks for the respondent’s opinions on 
economic issues such as unemployment, prices, the general economic 
situation, and their own personal expenditure. In most cases, respondents 
are asked one question regarding actual outcomes, and one question 
regarding expectations for future months. These types of questions 
produce a dataset of qualitative responses, and in order to be able to use 
4.  
The Data 
 
3 A detailed account of the methodology is available at http://www.esri.ie/docs/ 
CSI_METHOD.PDF  
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this data in an analysis such as this one, the general practice is to calculate 
the weighted balance for each question. This balance is the difference 
between the weighted percentage of positives and the weighted percentage 
of negatives in the responses to each question. Data are generally available 
from the late 1990s, with a cut off point in early 2007. 
Table 4.1: Data Availability by Sector4 
   
Sector Survey Frequency Data Available 
    
  From To 
Construction Monthly January 1999 February 2007 
Industry Monthly July 1999 February 2007 
Retail Monthly March 1999 March 2007 
Services Monthly March 1999 March 2007 
Consumer Monthly February 1996 March 2007 
    
 
 Internal consistency testing involves comparing the responses concerning 
outcomes in a particular month to expectations expressed by respondents 
in previous months, and it shows how accurately the respondents predict 
their own future responses. The method of assessing internal consistency 
involves fitting a regression model in order to test the relationship between 
the reported trends in output and employment and the lagged expectations 
data on output and employment. In many cases, multiple lags were tested, 
due to the ambiguity of some of the expectations’ questions in the surveys, 
and the potential lack of consistency across all respondents in their 
interpretation of the questions. In addition, the regression analysis was 
performed using both raw and smoothed survey data. The data were 
smoothed using three period moving averages, and the purpose of this is to 
reduce some of the inherent variability of responses in surveys of this 
nature.  
5. 
Internal 
Consistency 
 
While assessing these results, it should be noted that sentiment at time t-
1 cannot be expected to fully predict outcomes at time t. As such, we 
should not expect the degree of fit to be exact. However, a certain level of 
consistency between expectations and realised observations is to be 
expected. Bearing this in mind, the most important points to note from the 
regression results are the sign and significance of the estimated coefficients, 
and the R2 values. Unsuccessful results have been omitted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 For a number of the testing procedures as many as 90 observations were available. 
However, many of the official series used in the external consistency tests were only 
available as quarterly figures. This meant that the survey data had to be converted to 
quarterly figures, and this obviously reduced the number of observations. In some cases 
this number was less than 30. 
 51
Table 5.1: Tests for Internal Consistency 
   
Sector Dependent Variable Independent Variable 
 
Construction 
 
Current work (CWORK) 
 
Contracts in hand (ORDER) 
 
Industry 
 
 
Volume of production (PRODL) 
Volume of production (PRODL) 
Volume of production (PRODL) 
Number of employees (REMPI) 
 
Expected production (PRODE) 
Total order book (ORTOT) 
Total new orders (ORNEW) 
Expected number of employees (EEMPI) 
 
Retail 
 
 
Current business/sales (CBUSR) 
Current stock levels (CSTOCKR) 
Number of employees (REMPR) 
 
Expected business/sales (EBUSR) 
Expected orders (EORDRR) 
Expected number of employees (EEMPR) 
 
Services 
 
 
Current business (CBUSS) 
Recent business (RBUSS) 
Number of employees (REMPS) 
 
Expected business (EBUSS) 
Expected business (EBUSS) 
Expected number of employees (EEMPS) 
 
Consumer 
 
Economic situation (ECSITL) 
Financial situation (FINSITL) 
Prices (PRICEL) 
 
Expected economic situation (ECSITE) 
Expected financial situation (FINSITE) 
Expected prices (PRICEE) 
   
 
5.1   CONSTRUCTION 
The variable CWORK refers to the question in which respondents are 
asked to describe how their level of work in the past month compares to 
that of the previous month. The variable ORDER is constructed using 
responses regarding work in progress and contracts in hand during the past 
month. This question is not an expectations’ question, however, we can use 
the data to examine the consistency between responses regarding contracts 
in hand and the subsequently reported work levels. 5  One- and two-period 
lags were tested, and while the estimated coefficients were positive and 
significant, the R2 values were unacceptably low.  
5.2   INDUSTRY 
The results of the industry survey tests are the most encouraging. Looking 
first at production, the variables PRODL and PRODE describe the volume 
of production in the past month, and expectations about production over 
the next three months, respectively. In spite of the wording of the question, 
the one- and two-period lag tests are the most successful, and these are 
displayed below. All four coefficient estimates are statistically significant, 
and while the correlation coefficients are higher for the smoothed data, the 
R2 values are more impressive for the raw data, having corrected for first-
order autocorrelation where appropriate. Figure 5.1 plots the raw data for 
PRODL and PRODE(-1), and it can be seen that, in general, there is a 
consistent relationship between the two. The consistency between 
production levels and total orders in previous months was also tested, 
although again this did not involve testing the performance of expectations 
variables. Nonetheless, the results were good – positive and significant 
coefficient estimates, and satisfactory R2 values, which again are slightly 
higher in the cases of the raw data, as shown below. 
 
Turning to employment, the variable REMPI refers to responses 
regarding the number of people employed by the firm in the past month, 
 
5 There is no output expectations question in this survey.  
 52 
compared with that of the previous month, while EEMPI refers to 
expectations for employment over the next three months. Again, the best 
results came from a one-period lag test. In this case, although both 
coefficient estimates are significant, the R2 values were disappointing. 
Table 5.2: Internal Consistency Results – Industry Survey 
      
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variable 
β1 
Estimate 6  
t-stat R2 Rho 
      
PRODL PRODE(-1) 0.62* 8.69 0.46 ---- 
Smoothed 
data 
 0.36* 4.38 0.2 0.81 
      
PRODL PRODE(-2) 0.62* 8.63 0.46 ---- 
Smoothed 
data 
 0.44* 5.47 0.28 0.8 
      
PRODL ORTOT(-1) 0.47* 8.00 0.42 ---- 
Smoothed 
data 
 0.64* 6.53 0.34 0.66 
      
PRODL ORNEW 0.76* 13.65 0.67 ---- 
Smoothed 
data 
 0.74* 10.89 0.58 0.68 
      
Figure 5.1: Survey Response Variables, PRODL and PRODE(-1) 
 
- 20
- 15
- 10
- 5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Aug- 99 Aug- 00 Aug- 01 Aug- 02 Aug- 03 Aug- 04 Aug- 05 Aug- 06N
et
 B
al
an
ce
, P
er
 C
en
t (
R
aw
)
P RODL P RODE ( - 1)
5.3   RETAIL 
The variable CBUSR describes the responses regarding the retail company’s 
current business position. Respondents are also asked to predict their 
business trend over the next six months. Multiple lags were tested, 
however, once again contrary to the wording of the expectations question, 
the best results were obtained when there was a one- or two-period lag on 
the expectations variable. Beyond a three-period lag, the coefficient 
estimates become negative. Looking at the one-period lag test results 
below, both coefficients are positive and significant, however, the R2 value 
in the case of the smoothed data is very low. 
 
These poor results are mirrored throughout the retail survey. Extremely 
low R2 values reported in the remaining tests indicate that no relationship 
exists between reported stock levels and expected future orders placed on 
 
6 β1 refers to the coefficient on the independent variable 
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suppliers, or between current employment and expected future 
employment.  
Table 5.3: Internal Consistency Results – Retail Survey 
      
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
  Variable 
β1 Estimate  t-stat R2 Rho 
      
CBUSR EBUSR(-1) 0.53* 5.87 0.27 0.42 
Smoothed data  0.26* 2.88 0.08 0.95 
      
 
5.4   SERVICES  
The services survey asks respondents to consider both their current and 
recent business position, CBUSS and RBUSS respectively. As in the other 
surveys, they are also asked about their expectations regarding their level of 
business during the next few months. Multiple lags were tested, however, 
the results obtained were poor. Although a number of positive coefficients 
were estimated, not all of these were significant, and once again the R2 
statistics were poor. Furthermore, many of the reported Rho values were 
extremely high, suggesting the presence of unit roots. The employment 
variables produced similar disappointing results. Once again, although the 
coefficients were significant and correctly signed, the R2 values indicate a 
lack of consistency between employment levels and prior expectations 
about employment, particularly in the case of the raw data. The R2 value 
was slightly more encouraging in the case of the smoothed data, however, 
once again the Rho value was extremely high. It must be concluded that, 
overall, the services survey responses perform badly in the internal 
consistency testing procedure. 
5.5   CONSUMER 
The variable ECSITL refers to the responses on how the general economic 
situation in this country has changed over the last twelve months. The 
variable ECSITE asks how they think the general economic situation will 
develop over the next twelve months. Similarly, respondents are asked 
about the change in their financial situation over the last twelve months 
(FINSITL) and the expected change in their financial situation over the 
coming twelve months (FINSITE). In spite of the wording of the 
questions, it cannot be assumed that all survey participants base their 
responses on a full twelve month period, and so multiple lags were tested. 
The most superior results did in fact come from the tests in which the 
expectations variables were lagged by twelve periods. However, these 
results still proved disappointing. Although all four coefficients were 
correctly signed, and three of these were statistically significant, the R2 
values were poor, and the Rho values extremely high. Internal consistency 
tests were also performed on the responses regarding prices, again using a 
twelve period lag on the expectations variable. In the case of both the raw 
and smoothed data, the coefficients were not statistically significant, and 
the R2 values were zero.   
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5.6   INTERNAL CONSISTENCY: CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The results from this section are mixed. The industry survey performs well, 
particularly on the output side. The data for the production variables 
indicate a significant degree of consistency between expectations and 
subsequent realisations. Elsewhere, the results are less promising. The 
construction survey results produced very poor R2 values, although as 
mentioned previously, the independent variable is not an expectations 
variable, and as such, we cannot conclude that this survey has failed a true 
test of internal consistency. The results for both the retail and services 
surveys, however, are undeniably poor. With very few exceptions, the R2 
statistics are unacceptably low, and it must be concluded from this that 
there is no consistency between the respondents’ expectations about future 
output or employment, and their subsequently reported outcomes.  
 
Unsatisfactory results in the internal consistency tests do not preclude 
the use of data from these surveys in the subsequent analysis of external 
consistency. The rationale for performing these tests is that if the survey 
expectations variable is found to be consistent with the survey outcome 
variable, and this outcome variable is subsequently found to be consistent 
with the official data, then the survey expectations variable can be used in 
short-term forecasting. Expectations variables have a very significant 
information time lead over official statistics. However, if the expectations 
variable fails the internal consistency test, the survey outcomes may still be 
useful forecasting tools, given the timeliness of their release.  
 
One important point that has emerged from the different lag tests 
performed on the business survey responses is that the expectations 
expressed by the respondents seem to represent a very short future time 
horizon. The one- and two-period lag results dominate in all tests, even 
when respondents are asked to consider a longer time period. Kearney 
(1991) drew the same conclusions in her internal consistency testing, and 
suggested that perhaps the reason respondents only consider a very short 
future time horizon is that they complete the same questionnaire each 
month. 
 
The consumer survey performs particularly badly in the internal 
consistency tests, although perhaps this is not altogether surprising. The 
average consumer may not be as capable of responding accurately to some 
of their own survey questions as a recipient of one of the business surveys 
might be of answering their own questions. A consumer cannot be 
expected to know as much about the general economic situation as an 
industry survey respondent knows about production levels in his own 
company, for example. Furthermore, these issues may be worsened by the 
fact that the questions in the consumer survey are based over a longer time 
period. It is therefore not unreasonable to suggest that the views expressed 
by consumers a year ago, regarding the economic situation over the next 
year, may not match their current responses regarding the change in the 
economic situation over the previous year.  
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The forecasting potential of the survey data is best explored by testing the 
external consistency. This involves comparing the survey data on outcomes 
with a range of official data series. The survey data has a publication lag of 
approximately four weeks, and therefore has an important advantage over 
the official quantitative series, which typically have much lengthier 
publication lags. The aim of this analysis, therefore, is to ascertain whether 
or not this advantage may be exploited for the purpose of short-term 
forecasting, by testing the consistency between the survey data and the 
equivalent official series. 
6. 
External 
Consistency 
 
The relationships tested are listed in Table 6.1. Many of the official 
series used were only available as quarterly statistics. In these cases, the 
independent variables were compiled as the average of the three monthly 
responses relating to each quarter. Where monthly series are used, three 
month moving averages were also tested as dependent and independent 
variables. All of the dependent variables in the business survey tests are 
expressed either as percentage monthly changes or percentage quarterly 
changes, depending on the frequency of the official series in question. The 
dependent variables in the consumer survey are expressed as annual 
percentage changes.7  In spite of the fact that the business surveys ask 
respondents to discount seasonal effects, previous studies have detected a 
problem of seasonality in the survey responses (Conniffe, 1985). Ideally, 
the survey responses should be compared to the de-seasonalised official 
data, as it is the intention of these surveys to predict de-seasonalised trends. 
However, given the previous findings of seasonality in the survey 
responses, where possible, tests were conducted using both raw and de-
seasonalised official series.  
 
Finally, due to the ambiguous wording of some of the survey questions, 
different leads and lags were tested. Only the results deemed most 
informative are reported – all others have been omitted8 . While assessing 
the results, it must be noted that we are testing relationships between 
qualitative and quantitative variables. As such, we are asking that the 
respondents’ sentiment explain observed outcomes in production and 
employment, and so we cannot expect very impressive R2 statistics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 The dependent variables are all expressed as percentage changes because all survey 
questions ask respondents to compare across time periods, i.e. the response will be 
‘higher’, ‘same’ or ‘lower’. Unlike the other surveys, the consumer survey asks respondents 
to compare current conditions with those of twelve months ago, and so the official 
statistics are expressed as annual percentage changes. 
8 The most superior set of results for each of the 19 tests outlined in Table 6.1 have been 
reported in the Appendix. Any additional results that showed negative coefficient 
estimates and low R2 values were deemed worthless, and were omitted from this report. 
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Table 6.1: Tests for External Consistency9 
   
Sector Dependent Variable 10  Independent Variable 
 
Construction 
 
Index of Total Production (ITPC) 
Monthly Index of Employment (MIEC) 
QNHS Employment (QNHSC) 
 
Current work, quarterly (CWORKQ) 
Expected employment (EEMPC(-1)) 
Expected employment, quarterly (EEMPCQ(-1)) 
 
Industry 
 
 
Monthly Industrial Prod. Index (MIPI) 
No. of Employees in Industry (EMPI) 
QNHS Employment (QNHSI) 
 
Volume of production (PRODL) 
Number of employees, quarterly (REMPIQ) 
Number of employees, quarterly (REMPIQ) 
 
Retail 
 
 
Expenditure on Consumer Goods (PECG) 
Monthly Retail Sales Index (MRSI) 
QNHS Employment (QNHSR) 
 
Current business, quarterly (CBUSRQ) 
Current business, quarterly (CBUSRQ) 
Number of employees, quarterly (REMPRQ) 
 
Services 
 
 
Services sector GDP (GDPS) 
QNHS Employment (QNHSS) 
 
Current business, quarterly (CBUSSQ) 
Number of employees, quarterly (REMPS) 
 
Consumer 
 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
Expenditure on Consumer Goods (PECG) 
Expenditure on Consumer Goods (PECG) 
Expenditure on Consumer Goods (PECG) 
Expenditure on Consumer Goods (PECG) 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
QNHS Unemployment (QNHSU) 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
Expenditure on Consumer Goods (PECG) 
Monthly Retail Sales Index (MRSI) 
 
Economic situation, quarterly (ECSITLQ) 
Economic situation, quarterly (ECSITLQ) 
Expected economic situation, quarterly (ECSITEQ) 
Financial situation, quarterly (FINSITLQ) 
Expected financial situation, quarterly (FINSITEQ) 
Prices (PRICEL) 
Expected unemployment, quarterly (UEMPEQ) 
Consumer Sentiment Index, quarterly (CSIQ) 
Consumer Sentiment Index, quarterly (CSIQ) 
Consumer Sentiment Index, quarterly (CSIQ) 
   
 
6.1   CONSUMER 
A number of tests were performed using the data from the consumer 
survey. GDP data were used to test the external consistency of the survey 
variable relating to responses on how the general economic situation has 
changed over the last twelve months. Responses regarding expectation for 
unemployment levels were tested against the official unemployment 
statistics from the QNHS, using the appropriate lag on the survey 
expectations variable. 11  The third external consistency test compared 
responses to the question regarding prices with the official Consumer Price 
Index. These data are available monthly, and so the tests were performed 
 
9 As these variables appear in the results tables, an additional ‘M’ in front of the variable 
indicates that three-period moving averages have been calculated. ‘Q’ indicates that it has 
been converted to a quarterly variable. ‘S’ indicates that the variable has been seasonally 
adjusted. 
10 All of the official series were obtained on the Central Statistics Office website: 
www.cso.ie  
11 The employment expectations variable was transformed into a quarterly variable, so that 
it could be compared with the data from the QNHS. Given that the question asks 
respondents about expectations for the next twelve months, the appropriate lag on the 
variable is four periods, as shown in Table 6.2a. 
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using both raw and smoothed data. The results are presented in Table 6.2a 
below. All of the coefficient estimates are positive and significant, and the 
degree of fit is good. 
Table 6.2a: External Consistency Results – Survey Responses and Their Official Data 
Equivalents 
      
Dependent Variable Independent Variable β1 Estimate t-stat R2 Rho 
GDP 
GDP(S) 
QNHSU 
(M)CPI 
ECSITLQ 
ECSITLQ 
UEMPEQ(-4) 
(M)PRICEL 
0.04 
0.04 
0.17 
0.04 
3.92 
3.88 
2.20 
5.91 
0.31 
0.31 
0.15 
0.21 
---- 
---- 
0.77 
0.68 
 
 
While these tests compared the survey responses with their official data 
equivalents, a number of other tests were conducted which examined the 
theory that the sentiment expressed by the average consumer may influence 
the behaviour of the average consumer. The first of these tests compares 
the ECSITL variable with the official statistics for personal expenditure. 
For example, if the average consumer reports that the general economic 
situation has got a lot better over the last twelve months, is this mirrored 
by an increase in the average consumer’s personal expenditure over that 
time period? The variable relating to expectations about the economic 
situation (ECSITE) was also tested against personal expenditure, in order 
to explore the possible relationship between the two. If the average 
consumer expects the economic situation to improve or worsen over the 
coming year, is this reflected in average expenditure patterns? The 
responses regarding the survey participant’s own personal finances were 
also tested against personal expenditure in a similar manner.12  Finally, the 
overall Consumer Sentiment Index was used in tests with GDP, personal 
expenditure, and the Monthly Retail Sales Index.  
 
With the exception of the final test, all the coefficients estimates are 
positive and significant, and the R2 values are good. The results of these 
successful tests are provided in Table 6.2b. Looking first at personal 
expenditure, the results suggest that when the average consumer believes 
that the economic situation has improved over the last twelve months, the 
personal expenditure of the average consumer has also increased over the 
last twelve months. A similar correlation is apparent between the 
consumer’s financial situation and personal expenditure. The tests 
conducted using the expectations variables examine the relationship 
between the consumer’s predictions for the future and their personal 
expenditure. Multiple lags were tested, and the most superior results were 
found when the expectations variables were lagged by two quarters. Finally, 
the examination of the correlation between the overall Consumer 
Sentiment Index and both GDP and personal expenditure produced good 
results, particularly in the latter case.  
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Table 6.2b: External Consistency Results – Consumer Sentiment and Consumer Behaviour 
 
PECG 
PECG(S) 
PECG 
PECG(S) 
PECG 
PECG(S) 
PECG 
PECG(S) 
GDP 
GDP(S) 
PECG 
PECG(S) 
 
ECSITLQ 
ECSITLQ 
ECSITEQ(-2) 
ECSITEQ(-2) 
FINSITL 
FINSITL 
FINSITE(-2) 
FINSITE(-2) 
CSIQ 
CSIQ 
CSIQ 
CSIQ 
 
0.04 
0.04 
0.06 
0.06 
0.11 
0.11 
0.12 
0.12 
0.09 
0.08 
0.08 
0.08 
 
6.93 
6.92 
7.01 
7.18 
5.34 
5.36 
5.34 
5.32 
3.91 
3.85 
6.61 
6.60 
 
0.59 
0.58 
0.60 
0.60 
0.46 
0.46 
0.46 
0.45 
0.31 
0.31 
0.56 
0.56 
 
---- 
---- 
---- 
---- 
---- 
---- 
---- 
---- 
---- 
---- 
---- 
 
 
These results suggest that the consumer survey data may possess some 
forecasting potential. In particular, personal expenditure is highly correlated 
with consumer sentiment regarding the recent and future economic 
situation, and their own financial situation. Unfortunately, the graphs of 
these variables13  suggest that the data are incapable of predicting turning 
points in the official series, but merely the overall trend. 
6.2   INDUSTRY 
The Monthly Industrial Production Index, provided by the CSO, was 
selected as an appropriate official series for the purpose of testing the 
external consistency of the survey data. The monthly change in this index 
was used as the dependent variable, in order to test the usefulness of the 
PRODL variable derived from Question 1 on the industry survey. Again, 
both the official series and the survey data were smoothed using three 
period moving averages, because of the volatility of monthly series. 
Seasonally adjusted data for the Industrial Production Index were also 
tested. Two different official measures of employment were used to test the 
external consistency of the survey responses regarding employment. The 
first, EMPI, is a measure of the number of employees in manufacturing, 
and this is a quarterly statistic. The second is the Quarterly National 
Household Survey figure for employment in industry, and this was available 
in the form of both raw and seasonally adjusted data. 
 
With regard to output, the results from the external consistency tests are 
very disappointing. While all but one of the estimated coefficients are 
correctly signed, only one of these estimates is significant at the 5 per cent 
level. Furthermore, the degree of fit is extremely low. Therefore, we must 
conclude that there is no consistency between the official statistics and the 
survey responses on industrial production levels.  
 
In light of these poor results, the Industrial Production Index weighted 
by the wage bill was also tested as a dependent variable. The rationale for 
this test is the dominance of high-tech firms in the standard Index of 
Industrial Production. In order to test for the existence of a superior 
 
13 A selection of graphs is shown in the Appendix.  
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relationship between the weighted Industrial Production Index and the 
survey responses regarding output, the PRODL variable had to be 
converted to a quarterly series. These results did, in fact, prove superior to 
the results of the tests using the unweighted index. Table 6.3 shows that for 
both tests the coefficients are positive and statistically significant, and, 
while not spectacular, the R2 values are a vast improvement on those from 
the unweighted IPI tests.  
Table 6.3: CSO Industrial Production Index Weighted by the Wage Bill, and Survey Responses 
Regarding Industrial Output 
      
Dependent Variable Independent Variable β1 Estimate t-stat   R2 Rho 
IPIWQ 
IPIWQ 
PRODLQ 
PRODLQ(+1) 
0.14 
0.16 
2.05 
2.37 
0.15 
0.19 
-0.81 
-0.84 
      
 
The employment results are more encouraging. In particular, a good 
relationship was found between the number of employees in manufacturing 
(EMPI) and survey responses on industrial employment levels. These 
results are shown in Table 6.4. The estimated coefficient on the 
independent variable is positive and statistically significant, and the R2 value 
of 0.3 is one of the highest reported in this section. However, looking at 
Figure 6.1, the survey variable fails to track a number of turning points in 
the official series. 
Table 6.4: CSO Data on the Number of Employees in Manufacturing, and Survey Responses on  
Industrial Employment 
      
Dependent Variable Independent Variable β1 Estimate t-stat R2 Rho 
EMPI REMPIQ 0.11 3.18 0.30 ---- 
      
 
Figure 6.1: Official Number of Employees in Manufacturing and Survey 
Responses on Industrial Employment 
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6.3   RETAIL 
The Monthly Retail Sales Index was selected as an appropriate series for 
comparison with responses regarding current business. Three-period 
moving averages were calculated for both the retail sales index and the 
survey response data. Personal Expenditure on Consumer Goods was also 
used as an official statistic, against which the survey responses on current 
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business could be compared. Once again, the official measure of 
employment used was QNHS employment data for the retail sector.  
 
The results for the retail sector overall are poor, and indicate that there 
is no relationship between monthly retail sales and survey responses 
regarding current business, or between QNHS employment and survey 
responses regarding current employment levels. There is, however, a good 
statistical relationship between seasonally adjusted expenditure on 
consumer goods, and the current business/sales position reported by 
survey respondents, especially when tested with a one-period lag on the 
current business variable. These results are shown in Table 6.5. However, a 
graph of this relationship shows that, while the general trend is the same, 
the survey variable misses a number of turning points in the official series, 
as shown in Figure 6.2. 
Table 6.5: Personal Consumption (Seasonally Adjusted) and Survey Responses on Current 
Business 
      
Dependent Variable Independent Variable β1 Estimate t-stat R2 Rho 
 
PECG(S) 
PECG(S) 
 
CBUSRQ 
CBUSRQ(+1) 
 
0.02 
0.03 
 
2.61 
3.44 
 
0.26 
0.36 
 
-0.55 
-0.6 
 
Figure 6.2: Personal Consumption and Survey Responses on Current 
 Business/Sales 
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6.4 SERVICES 
GDP in the services sector was used as an official series, and tests were 
undertaken to check the consistency between this variable, and the survey 
response variable relating to current work. GDP is supplied as a quarterly 
series, and so the survey responses were averaged over the three months in 
each quarter. Tests were conducted using the quarterly percentage changes 
in both the raw and seasonally adjusted GDP series. The dependent 
variable in the employment tests was once again the quarterly percentage 
change in QNHS employment. 
 
A good relationship was reported between seasonally adjusted GDP and 
the “current business” variable. (See Table 6.6.) The estimated coefficient is 
positive and significant, and the R2 is the highest reported in this section. 
However, the graph indicates that this variable is incapable of tracking the 
turning points in GDP. The employment tests did not yield positive results. 
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While the two estimated coefficients were correctly signed, neither was 
statistically significant, and so we must conclude that there is no 
relationship between the QNHS employment series and the employment 
levels reported by survey respondents. 
Table 6.6: Service Sector GDP (Seasonally Adjusted) and Survey Responses on Current 
 Business 
      
Dependent Variable Independent Variable β1 Estimate t-stat    R2 Rho 
GDPS(S) CBUSSQ 0.02 4.02 0.37 -0.39 
      
Figure 6.3: Services Sector GDP and Survey Responses on Current 
Business 
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6.5 CONSTRUCTION 
In relation to production, the Index of Total Production in Building and 
Construction (ITPC) was selected as an appropriate series with which 
current work levels expressed in the survey could be compared. The ITPC 
is a quarterly series, and so it is expressed as quarterly percentage changes 
here. With regard to employment, two official series were selected for 
testing. The first is the Monthly Index of Employment in Building and 
Construction (MIEC), and the second is the employment series from the 
Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS). Tests were conducted 
using the quarterly percentage changes in both the raw and seasonally 
adjusted QNHS series. The independent variable used in the employment 
tests was expectations of future employment expressed by survey 
respondents, due to the fact that the actual observed employment response 
data were unavailable. The results of all of these tests are provided in the 
Appendix. 
 
Looking first at output, the relationship between the Index of Total 
Production and the survey responses regarding work levels was weak, with 
a reported R2 value of just 0.12. The results of the monthly employment 
series were equally poor. None of the reported R2 values exceeded 0.1, and 
so no relationship exists between the Monthly Index of Employment, and 
survey respondents’ expectations about employment. In spite of the prior 
expectation that the survey series might be more capable of predicting the 
seasonally adjusted official series, the best results in this sector come from 
the comparison between the raw QNHS series and lagged employment 
expectations. The results are presented in Table 6.7. While the R2 value of 
0.23 is not overly impressive, Figure 6.4 indicates a good degree of 
consistency between the QNHS series and survey respondents’ 
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employment expectations over the time period studied. This is particularly 
apparent from 2003 Q1 onwards. During this period, the survey variable 
Table 6.7: QNHS (Unadjusted) and Su ey Respondents’ Employment Expectations 
tracks the turning points in the official series very well. 
rv
      
Dependent Variable Independent Variable β1 Estimate t-stat R2 Rho 
QNHSC EEMPCQ(-1) 0.09 2.91 0.23 ---- 
Figure 6.4 ent and Survey Respondent's Employment 
 Expectations 
ive, these statistics are 
urvey variables 
missed a number of the turning points in the official series.  
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6.6 EXTERNAL CONSISTENCY: CONCLUDING REMARKS 
As mentioned, this testing procedure compares sentiment data and official 
quantitative statistics, and as such, is extremely demanding of the survey 
series. The results in this section suggest that many of the survey variables 
have little or no predictive power. The vast majority of the tests conducted 
resulted in R2 values lower than 0.1, and while it was stressed that we 
should not expect the R2 values to be impress
nacceptably low. 
 
u
With regard to the business survey data, four good relationships 
between the survey series and the official series were reported in this 
section – one for each of the four surveys. These preliminary findings 
suggest that the four survey variables used in these tests may possess some 
forecasting potential. The graphical analysis indicates that the employment 
data from the construction survey are capable of tracking the seasonally 
unadjusted QNHS employment series. This is an important result, and the 
relationship between these variables certainly merits further investigation. 
Unfortunately, the graphs of the three other statistical relationships did not 
display such promising results. In each of these cases, the s
 
The consumer survey produced some promising results. The statistical 
relationships between the survey variables and their official equivalents 
were good, with the exception of the relationship between the overall 
Consumer Sentiment Index and the Retail Sales Index. The most 
impressive results were produced when a selection of the survey response 
variables were compared with data on personal expenditure. The results 
suggest that survey data on the overall economic situation and on personal 
finances are highly correlated with the official data on personal 
expenditure, and this relationship could perhaps be exploited for the 
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purposes of forecasting. Unfortunately, the graphs suggest that the survey 
variables may not be capable of tracking turning points in the official series, 
ut merely the overall trend in that series. 
may still be useful forecasting tools, given the 
meliness of their release. 
 
e relationships could perhaps be exploited for the purposes of 
forecasting.  
 
b
 
 The findings in this analysis suggest that the potential of the survey data 
is limited. This verdict is based on the results of both the internal and 
external consistency testing procedures. First, only the industry survey 
provides variables that fully satisfy the internal consistency condition. 
Although the results from the construction survey are somewhat 
inconclusive, the retail, services and consumer results are unquestionably 
poor. It was argued, however, that the disappointing results from the 
consumer survey were not altogether surprising. In any case, unsatisfactory 
results in the internal consistency tests do not preclude the use of data 
from these surveys in the subsequent analysis of external consistency. They 
do, however, imply that the survey expectations variables may be unreliable 
indicators, and may not be useful for short-term forecasting purposes. The 
survey outcomes variables 
7.  
Conclusion 
ti
The external consistency testing procedure is extremely demanding of 
the survey variables. In spite of this admission, a number of the reported R2 
values were unacceptably low, and lead to the unavoidable conclusion that 
the associated variables are worthless, in terms of forecasting. With regard 
to the business surveys, four survey variables produced results that, at the 
very least, make these variables worthy of further examination.14  The test 
results from the consumer survey were far superior to those from any other 
survey. With the exception of the relationship between the Consumer 
Sentiment Index and the Retail Sales Index, all of the tests conducted 
found positive and significant coefficients, suggesting that a number of 
statistical relationships exist between the survey series and the official data, 
and that thes
 
Several areas of this analysis merit additional attention. In some of the 
tests performed, the sample size was very small. An increased sample might 
strengthen the results from these testing procedures. An extension of this 
study might examine the business survey series at a disaggregated level. 
Kearney (1991) argued that the heterogeneity of the firms in the different 
sectors and sub-sectors cannot be adequately captured by the weighting 
procedures used. In addition, there is a question mark over the 
representativeness of the surveys, and it is likely that this is more 
satisfactory in some areas than others. This certainly merits further 
investigation, in order to ascertain the extent of the issue, and how it may 
be improved. Furthermore, the ambiguous wording of some of the survey 
questions may need to be addressed. While multiple lags may be tested 
during the internal consistency testing in order to obtain the best 
relationship, it must still be assumed in this analysis that all firms interpret 
the questions in the same way. This is clearly an invalid assumption, and 
more accurate phrasing of survey questions might eliminate this problem to 
a certain extent. Specifically, it would appear that responses seem to 
14 These variables were: employment expectations in the construction survey (EEMPCQ), 
observed employment in the industry survey (REMPIQ), current business/sales in the 
retails survey (CBUSRQ), and current business in the services survey (CBUSSQ). 
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ire respondents to consider three 
or more periods ahead should be revised. 
REFERENCES 
BR
the Italian Economy. Rome: Insituto di Studi e Analisi 
CH
e Macroeconomy?” American Economist,  Vol. 44, No. 1,  
CO
ommentary, July, Dublin: The Economic and Social Research 
EU
ey Indicators for Conjuctural Analysis.” Monthly 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2005. “Retail Trade Confidence as an 
shop on Recent Developments in Business and Consumer 
HO
vailable at: http:// 
HÜ
entre for 
KE nary Analysis of the CII/ESRI Business 
LU r 
ME
 Conference of the Irish 
PA tent of Consumer 
SAN
 
Economics Department Working Papers, No. 170, OECD Publishing. 
 
represent only one or two future time periods, regardless of the wording of 
the question. As such, questions that requ
UNCO, G. and M. MALGARINI, 2002. An Indicator of Economic 
Sentiment for 
Economica. 
OPIN, M. and Ali F. DARRAT, 2000. “Can Consumer Attitudes 
Forecast th
pp. 34-42. 
NNIFFE, D., 1985. “Seasonality in the Business Survey.” Quarterly 
Economic C
Institute. 
ROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, 2006. “The Usefulness of Business 
Tendency Surv
Bulletin, May.  
Indicator for Retail Sales and Private Consumption”. Presented at the 
EU Work
Surveys. 
LICKOVA, E., 2005. “Business Survey and Short-Term Projection.” 
Presented at the joint European Commission – OECD Workshop on 
International Development of Business and Consumer Tendency 
Surveys, Brussels, November 2005. A
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/55/36/35558892.pdf 
FNER, P. and M. SCHRÖDER, 2002. “Forecasting Economic Activity 
in Germany – How Useful are Sentiment Indicators?” C
European Economic Research, Discussion Paper No. 02-56. 
ARNEY, I., 1991. “A Prelimi
Survey Data.” ESRI, mimeo. 
DVIGSON, S., 2004. “Consumer Confidence and Consume
Spending.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol.18, No. 2, pp. 29-50. 
RRIMAN, B. and C. O’REARDON, 1995. “The IBEC-ESRI Monthly 
Industrial Survey: An Analysis of its Potential for Macroeconomic 
Forecasting.” Presented to the Annual
Economic Association, Cavan, May 2005. 
IN, N. and M. WEALE, 2001. “The Information Con
Surveys.” National Institute Economic Review, No. 178.  
TERO, T. and N. WESTERLUND, 1996. “Confidence Indicators 
and Their Relationship to Changes in Economic Activity.” OECD
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 
External Consistency Results 
 
Dependent Independent β1 Estimate t-stat R2  Rho 
Variable Variable 
 
ITPC CWORKQ 0.24 1.82 0.12 ---- 
MIEC EEMPC(-1) 0.04 1.61 0.03 ---- 
MIEC (M)EEMPC(-1) 0.05 1.90 0.04 ---- 
(M)MIEC EEMPC(-1) 0.03 ∗  1.99 0.04 0.43 
(M)MIEC (M)EEMPC(-1) 0.05* 2.11 0.05 0.44 
MIEC EEMPC 0.07* 2.72 0.07 ---- 
MIEC (M)EEMPC 0.04* 2.41 0.06 ---- 
(M)MIEC EEMPC 0.07* 2.74 0.08 0.40 
(M)MIEC (M)EEMPC 0.09* 3.26 0.10 0.44 
QNHSC EEMPCQ(-1) 0.09* 2.91 0.23 ---- 
QNHSC(S) EEMPCQ(-1) 0.12 0.86 0.05 0.59 
 
MIPI PRODL 0.16 1.81 0.04 -0.29 
MIPI (M)PRODL 0.14 1.28 0.02 -0.26 
(M)MIPI PRODL 0.10* 2.05 0.05 0.30 
(M)MIPI (M)PRODL 0.14 1.80 0.04 0.32 
MIPI(S) PRODL -0.01 -0.22 0.00 -0.49 
MIPI(S) (M)PRODL 0.02 0.31 0.00 -0.49 
(M)MIPI(S) PRODL -0.0006 -0.02 0.00 ----
  
(M)MIPI(S) (M)PRODL 0.02 0.5 0.00 ---- 
EMPI REMPIQ 0.11* 3.18 0.30 ---- 
QNHSI REMPIQ 0.06 1.54 0.08 -0.32
  
QNHSI(S) REMPIQ 0.05* 2.14 0.14 ---- 
 
PECG CBUSRQ 0.03 0.68 0.02 -0.46 
PECG(S) CBUSRQ 0.02* 2.61 0.26 -0.55 
PECG CBUSRQ(+1) 0.05 1.29 0.06 -0.48 
PECG(S) CBUSRQ(+1) 0.03* 3.44 0.36 -0.6 
MRSI CBUSR -0.3 -0.65 0.004 -0.34 
MRSI (M)CBUSR -0.02 -0.38 0.002 -0.34 
(M)MRSI CBUSR -0.02 -0.30 0.001 0.28 
(M)MRSI (M)CBUSR -0.004 -0.57 0.004 0.28 
MRSI(S) CBUSR -0.009 -0.51 0.00 -0.49 
MRSI(S) (M)CBUSR -0.001 -1.10 0.01 -0.53 
(M)MRSI(S) CBUSR -0.001 -0.21 0.005 0.22 
(M)MRSI(S) (M)CBUSR -0.006 -0.89 0.02 0.21 
QNHSR REMPRQ -0.02 -0.08 0.00 -0.57 
QNHSR(S) REMPRQ 0.0004 0.00 0.00 ---- 
 
 
 
∗ Significant at 5 per cent level. 
Rho values indicate that corrections have been made for AR(1). 
Lags are indicated between parentheses. 
All dependent variables are expressed as monthly or quarterly percentage changes. (Annual percentage 
changes in the case of the consumer survey.) 
An additional ‘M’ in parentheses in front of a variable indicates that three-period moving averages have 
been calculated. ‘S’ in parentheses following a variable indicates that it is seasonally adjusted. 
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Dependent Independent β1 Estimate t-stat R2  Rho 
Variable Variable 
 
GDPS CBUSSQ 0.03 1.13 0.04 ---- 
GDPS(S) CBUSSQ 0.02* 4.02 0.37 -0.39 
QNHSS REMPSQ 0.06 1.29 0.05 ---- 
QNHSS(S) REMPSQ 0.02 1.56 0.08 ---- 
 
GDP ECSITLQ 0.04* 3.92 0.31 ---- 
GDP(S) ECSITLQ 0.04* 3.88 0.31 ---- 
QNHSU UEMPEQ(-4) 0.17* 2.20 0.15 0.77 
MCPI MPRICEL 0.04* 5.91 0.21 0.68 
PECG ECSITLQ 0.04* 6.93 0.59 ---- 
PECG(S) ECSITLQ 0.04* 6.92 0.58 ---- 
PECG ECSITEQ(-2) 0.06* 7.01 0.60 ---- 
PECG(S) ECSITEQ(-2) 0.06* 7.18 0.60 ---- 
PECG FINSITL 0.11* 5.34 0.46 ---- 
PECG(S) FINSITL 0.11* 5.36 0.46 ---- 
PECG FINSITE(-2) 0.12* 5.34 0.46 ---- 
PECG(S) FINSITE(-2) 0.12* 5.32 0.45 ---- 
GDP CSIQ 0.09* 3.91 0.31 ---- 
GDP(S) CSIQ 0.08* 3.85 0.31 ---- 
PECG CSIQ 0.08* 6.61 0.56 ---- 
PECG(S) CSIQ 0.08* 6.60 0.56 ---- 
MRSI CSIQ 0.02 0.61 0.00 0.92 
MRSI(S) CSIQ 0.02 0.57 0.00 0.93 
 
Personal Expenditure and Survey Responses Regarding the Economic Situation 
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Personal Expenditure and the Overall Consumer Sentiment Index 
0
2
4
6
8
1 0
1 2
1 9 9 8 Q 1 1 9 9 9 Q 1 2 0 0 0 Q 1 2 0 0 1 Q 1 2 0 0 2 Q 1 2 0 0 3 Q 1 2 0 0 4 Q 1 2 0 0 5 Q 1 2 0 0 6 Q 1
PE
CG
, A
nn
ua
l P
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
Ch
an
ge
0
2 0
4 0
6 0
8 0
1 0 0
1 2 0
1 4 0
CS
IQ
P E C G C S IQ
 
 67
AN EMPIRICAL 
ANALYSIS OF 
DEVELOPMENT CYCLES 
IN THE DUBLIN OFFICE 
MARKET 1976-2007* 
John McCartney**  
 
 Commercial property has taken centre-stage in recent debates about Ireland’s banking 
system and the health of our economy. However, these debates have been hampered by a 
lack of empirical research on non-residential real estate. This article sheds light on one 
key segment of the commercial property sector – the Dublin office market. Using 32 
years of annual data, a simple regression model is elaborated which explains office 
completions. This indicates that office starts react to two key demand signals – rental 
growth and lettings activity, with completions following after an 18 month construction 
lag. Reliance on these simple demand signals, combined with a lengthy construction lag, 
leads to periodic supply overshoots. In turn, this contributes to the boom-bust pattern that 
has characterised office building in Dublin over many years. We are now entering the 
‘bust’ phase of this cycle. Office completions remained strong in 2008 but the Dublin 
market is now overbuilt. Our model predicts that output will fall by 48 per cent next 
year and by a further 14 per cent in 2010. All else equal this will deduct 0.5-0.6 per 
Abstract 
 
* The author wrote and submitted this article in his previous capacity as Head of Research 
at Lisney Estate Agents.   
** The author is grateful to all those whose contributions helped in the preparation of this 
article. Particular thanks to David Duffy, Paddy McDonald, Stephen Walsh and an 
anonymous referee for detailed comments on earlier drafts. The views expressed herein 
are the personal opinions of the author and this article in no way purports to represent the 
views of any other individual or institution. Any errors remain the author’s. E-mail: 
j.mccartney@yahoo.ie. 
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cent directly from GNP and will lead to the loss of approximately 7,500 construction 
jobs.  
 
 The residential property market has provoked lively debate in all sections 
of Irish society. Reams have been written about house prices in the popular 
press and property has become the staple fare of dinner party conversation. 
Policy makers, consultants and academics have also engaged with this 
subject and numerous reports and scholarly papers have been produced. 
To a large extent these endeavours have been facilitated by the availability 
of official data on Ireland’s housing market. Although these are far from 
perfect – for example we do not have complete information on the 
overhang of unsold properties – useful statistics are available on many 
aspects of the residential market. 
1. 
Introduction 
 
Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for commercial property where 
a lack of data has impeded our analysis of market dynamics. This is 
problematic, because non-residential real estate represents a significant part 
of Ireland’s economy that mainstream economics knows relatively little 
about. Commercial building, not including infrastructure, directly 
accounted for around 4 per cent of GNP in 2007.1 However, if we factor 
in expenditure on the fit-out of new buildings, not to mention spending 
associated with construction wages, property management and legal 
services, the total contribution to our economy is significantly higher.  
 
The objective of this article is to shed new light on one important 
segment of Ireland’s commercial property sector – the Dublin office 
market.2,3 Specifically, the paper aims to derive a statistical model which 
explains the quantum of new office space completed in any given year. It is 
hoped that this model will facilitate more accurate estimates of 
construction output in our macroeconomic forecasts. Moreover, by 
revealing the dynamics which underpin cycles in the Dublin market, the 
analysis in this article should help to inform the business decisions of office 
developers, investors and the institutions that fund them. 
 
Section 2 of the article briefly describes the Dublin office market. Inter 
alia, it provides information on the existing stock of buildings, the historical 
flow of new completions, annual trends in take-up, rental growth rates and 
the geographical distribution of office space within the city. The second 
section discusses factors that might influence developers’ decisions to 
construct new office space. This conceptual discussion underpins the 
 
1 Based on output estimates by DKM Economic Consultants, expressed as a percentage of 
GNP after adjustment for imported intermediate consumption.  
2 Data limitations mean that the spatial level of analysis for most previous studies has been 
the single metropolitan area (McDonald, 2002).  
3 To give some idea of this paper’s coverage, figures from estate agents DTZ Sherry 
FitzGerald indicate that Dublin accounted for around three-quarters of the total office 
space in Dublin, Cork, Galway and Limerick at end-2007. Consistent with this, in their 
latest review of the construction industry, DKM Economic Consultants assume that 
Dublin represents 80 per cent of Ireland’s total office market. 
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derivation of a simple regression model that aims to explain Dublin office 
completions. Details of this model, and the empirical data that are used to 
estimate it, are provided in Section 3. The estimated model is then 
presented in Section 4, and the results are used to forecast Dublin office 
completions for the 2008-2010 period. The broader implications of this 
analysis are discussed in Section 5, before a brief summary and conclusion. 
 
 Dublin offices fall into two broad categories. On one hand, there are 
traditional Georgian office buildings. These are mainly located in the 
Central Business District to the south of the river Liffey, encompassing the 
postal areas of Dublin 2 and 4. Georgian office stock is also present in 
Dublin 1 which lies just to the north of the Liffey. Most of Dublin’s 
Georgian office buildings were constructed between 1750 and 1840.5 They 
typically encompass a net lettable area of 230-560 square metres (sq. m) and 
consist of four storeys over basement. However, these converted dwellings 
now account for a small and declining fraction of the overall office market. 
Their restricted scale, fragmented layouts and inflexible structures make 
them less appealing to larger IT intensive occupiers and some have now 
been restored to residential use. The Georgian market is explicitly excluded 
from the analysis in this paper. 
2. 
A Brief 
Description 
of the Dublin 
Office 
Market4 
 
Instead, we focus on purpose-built ‘Modern Offices’ which have been 
constructed since 1960.6 Within this heading, current industry convention 
is to classify the modern stock into “Second Generation” buildings (c. 
1960-1990) and “Third Generation” premises (1990-date). The former 
characteristically have solid concrete floors, single glazing and conventional 
heating systems. The latter feature raised access flooring (to facilitate IT 
wiring etc.), air conditioning and double glazing. In addition, these more 
recent buildings have flexible floor plates which can accommodate 
alternative layouts and sub-divisions.7  
 
At end-June 2008, the total stock of modern office space in Dublin was 
estimated at 3,118,907 sq m. Perhaps underlining the extent of Ireland’s 
economic growth in recent years, more than two-thirds of this space has 
been constructed since 1990 and can, therefore, be deemed to be “Third 
Generation”.  
 
Between 1976-2007 Dublin office completions averaged 79,125 sq m 
per annum. However, as the graph below demonstrates, office construction 
has been highly cyclical during this time, with four distinct peaks since 
 
4 Unless otherwise stated, the figures herein derive from an office market database 
maintained by chartered surveyors Lisney. 
5 Kealy et al. (2006) and O’Brien and Guinness (1994) provide detailed reviews of Dublin’s 
Georgian architectural history. 
6 McDonald (1985) notes that prior to 1960 there was just one large modern office block 
in Dublin – Busáras on Store Street. 
7 An additional category of environmentally sustainable “Fourth Generation” offices is 
now beginning to emerge (see Lisney, 2007; Power, 2008). As yet, however, only a few 
examples of these buildings exist in the Dublin market.  
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1976.8 This pattern closely follows international norms, with similar cycles 
having been observed in many other cities across the world (McDonald, 
2002; Mueller, 1999). Over our study period, the first three peaks in Dublin 
office building occurred at approximately 10-year intervals, with 
completions spiking in 1982, 1991 and 2001. Again this closely mirrors the 
international experience. For example, Wheaton (1987) studied a number 
of American cities and found that the typical office market cycle lasted for 
10-12 years. The Dublin market now appears to be approaching another 
peak. Just over 250,000 sq m of new office space was completed in 2007. 
This represented a rise of around 130 per cent on the previous year’s new 
construction and was the second highest total ever recorded. Current 
forecasts indicate that at least as much new space will be completed in 
2008.9 
Figure 1: Dublin Office Completions, 1976-2007 
 
0
50000
100000
150000
200000
250000
300000
350000
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
Sq
 M
 
In value terms, latest estimates indicate that offices accounted for one- 
quarter of commercial building output in 2007.10 This puts the value of 
office building behind that of retail, but almost on a par with agriculture 
and tourism combined, and well ahead of industrial. 
Table 1: Output Share of Commercial Building 2007 
  
Commercial Sector % 
Retail 35.62 
Agriculture/Tourism 27.28 
Office 24.82 
Industrial 12.28 
Total 100 
  
 Source: Adapted from DKM Economic Consultants (2008). 
 
 
8 Malone’s 1981 analysis of the Dublin office market indicates that the cyclical pattern of 
completions pre-dates this paper’s study period. Distinct output peaks were evident in 
1964 and again in 1972/1973. 
9 Lisney Dublin Office Market Update, July 2008.   
10 Derived from DKM Economic Consultants (2008) Review of the Construction Industry 2007 
and Outlook 2008-2010. Table A2.1. 
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Average take-up (i.e. office letting) during the 1976-2007 period was 
97,135 sq m per annum. The fact that take-up exceeds completions should 
not be surprising because some proportion of new lettings will always 
involve occupiers relocating. Similar to completions, take-up exhibits a 
cyclical pattern with four peaks and troughs visible over the last 32 years.  
 
During the 1970s and 1980s the main takers of Dublin office space were 
State bodies, the large indigenous banks and an assortment of professional 
practices. However, while these occupiers remain prominent, an expanding 
cohort of financial services firms has begun to account for an increasing 
share of the market, particularly since the development of the International 
Financial Services Centre (IFSC) in the late 1980s. Reflecting this, the share 
of Dublin office take-up accounted for by financial services companies 
increased from 6.5 per cent in 1999 to 45 per cent in 2007. 
 
Unsurprisingly, given the peaky nature of completions and take-up, 
Dublin office rents have also exhibited a highly cyclical pattern. Between 
1976-2007 there were four clear cycles in the market and, as illustrated in 
the graph below, the amplitude of these cycles has been substantial. 
Nominal rent growth reached a high of 33.3 per cent in 1999, but it also 
exceeded 30 per cent in the previous cyclical peaks of 1979 and 1989. In 
each case, however, these peaks were followed by periods of negative rental 
growth lasting for 3-4 years. The largest fall occurred in 1992 when rents 
declined by 13.2 per cent, but rental growth bottomed-out at –9.1 per cent 
on average over the last three troughs. Emphasising the extent of volatility 
within the rent cycle, the average peak-to-trough downswing in rental 
growth over the last three cycles has been 41.5 percentage points. 
Figure 2: Annual Growth in Dublin Office Rents, 1976-2007 
 
In terms of geographical distribution, the bulk of Dublin’s modern 
office space is located in the city centre. However, as the capital has 
developed, substantial office building has also occurred in the suburbs. 
Currently, suburban locations account for 1,115,039 sq m, or 35.8 per cent, 
of Dublin’s office stock. Within this, the South suburbs is the largest sub-
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market, accounting for 18.0 per cent of all modern office space in Dublin. 
The North suburbs and West suburbs account for 10.2 per cent and 7.5 per 
cent of stock respectively.  
 
 To understand the dynamics of office building it is necessary to consider 
the issue of development risk. In theory, rational developers will only 
undertake a new office project when the expected value of the completed 
property exceeds the development costs. However, while this might sound 
straightforward in principle, neither the costs nor the value of an office 
development are easy to estimate in advance (Herring and Wachter, 1999). 
On the costs side, various factors can lead to unexpected outlays. For 
example, planning delays and construction hold-ups (perhaps due to 
unforeseen environmental or geological problems) can result in significant 
budget overruns (Gordon, 2003).  
3.  
A Conceptual 
Model of 
Office 
Development 
 
On the benefits side, the uncertainties may be even greater. As well as 
affecting costs, ‘planning risk’ can radically alter project returns. For 
example, if planning authorities refuse a proposed development or impose 
significant conditions, the value of the scheme can be dramatically reduced.  
 
The value of new developments will also be affected by future demand 
for office space, which may be difficult to predict when a scheme is first 
being conceived. The capital value of a proposed building is usually 
calculated by discounting the expected stream of future rents to a present 
value (Harvey, 1981; Hendershott, 1996a). This calculation requires 
developers to make forecasts about several critical unknowns. Not only 
must they choose a discount rate (effectively an interest rate forecast), they 
must also estimate future office rents, which are clearly a function of 
market demand. In addition, because rental income only derives from space 
that is actually let, developers must also make some assessment about 
future rental voids, which will also reflect office demand (Herring and 
Wachter, 1999; McDonald, 2002). 
 
It is reasonable to assume that, in the absence of definitive information 
on future conditions, developers will try to mitigate their risk by carefully 
monitoring current market conditions and seeking evidence of a 
demonstrable appetite for new office space before embarking upon 
projects (Gordon, 2003). Intuitively, then, one would expect office 
development to be a strongly demand-led activity (Harvey, 1981), and this 
appears to be supported by previous empirical work (see McDonald, 2002 
and references therein). If this hypothesis is correct, then indicators of 
demand should help to explain office completions in the Dublin market. 
INDICATORS OF OFFICE DEMAND 
In their efforts to gauge market conditions, it is likely that developers and 
funding institutions will pay close attention to several key indicators. At the 
highest level, the requirement for office space should be positively 
correlated with overall economic growth. Therefore, we would expect 
developers to monitor economic conditions and undertake more office 
building projects in periods of strong growth. 
73 
 
Economic growth, however, is not the proximate cause of office 
demand. Rather, economic growth is associated with employment growth, 
which in turn creates a requirement for more office accommodation. 
Therefore labour market trends might provide developers with a more 
immediate signal of office demand. A priori, we would expect office 
construction to be positively associated with employment growth 
(Pollakowski, Wachter and Lynford, 1992). 
 
Another indicator of market conditions might be recent lettings activity. 
Take-up is not a perfect proxy of demand because some proportion of 
each year’s lettings represents a ‘churn’ of occupiers within the existing 
stock of space. In this sense, take-up does not measure the net additional 
requirement for new office space. But in itself, strong lettings can send a 
positive signal to developers. Where transactional activity is brisk and the 
market is fluid, developers and investors will have a better chance of 
securing occupiers for their buildings – even if this is at the expense of 
attracting tenants from other schemes.11 Intuitively, therefore, we would 
expect office completions to be positively associated with take-up. 
  
Although take-up contains valuable information for development 
stakeholders it is, as outlined above, an imperfect measure of net demand. 
For this reason, an additional variable – rental growth – might also be 
closely watched by developers and funding institutions. By capturing the 
interaction between lettings activity and the stock of available space, this 
indicator may give a more comprehensive picture of demand relative to 
supply.   
 
The market signals listed above are likely to influence developers’ 
decisions to initiate office-building projects. Consequently, they should be a 
good predictor of office starts. However, the aim of this paper is to explain 
variation in office completions. There are several reasons for this focus on 
completions rather than commencements. First, and most importantly, 
there are very limited data on office starts. From a practical perspective, 
this precludes the possibility of incorporating commencements as the 
dependent variable in our regression analysis. Second, the focus on 
completions is consistent with the methodology adopted in compiling our 
main macroeconomic statistics.12  
 
Because office buildings take some considerable time to construct, the 
demand signals that contemporaneously influence starts can only be 
 
11 Indeed, this hypothesis is consistent with evidence from the London market which 
found that office rents are positively related to mobility within the market (Wheaton, 
Torto and Evans, 1997). 
12 The main source of official data on construction output is the Annual Review and 
Outlook for the construction industry, which DKM Economic Consultants produce on 
behalf of the Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government. 
Estimates of office output are based on completions, adjusted for construction lags.  
These estimates are incorporated, with adjustment, by the Central Statistics Office (CSO) 
into its gross fixed capital formation figures in the National Accounts. 
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expected to affect completions with a time lag. The time required to build-
out an office scheme can vary depending on many factors, including the 
size of the building. However, industry experts suggest that, on average, 
major projects usually involve a construction phase of around 18 months 
(DKM Economic Consultants, 2008). Therefore, in formulating our model 
it is necessary to build in a time lag to reflect this. In practice, however, 
because the analysis is based on annual data, it is impossible to introduce a 
lag of precisely 18 months. Effectively, therefore, the choice is between one 
or two years. The decision between these options was determined on an 
empirical basis, as discussed in Section 4 below. 
 
 A simple linear model is elaborated below to explain Dublin office 
completions. This model is estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression, populated by 32 years of annual data (1976-2007 inclusive). This 
data set is smaller than would be ideal for a comprehensive econometric 
analysis. Indeed, data limitations are a recurring theme in the international 
literature, something which may derive from the fact that empirical 
research on commercial real estate markets invariably relies on data from 
private sources (McDonald, 2002). Some studies have attempted to address 
this problem by pooling data from multiple locations. For example, 
Pollakowski et al. (1992) analyse 10 years of annual data from 21 cities. 
However, although this approach provides additional observations for 
analysis, it does not alter the fact that office cycles typically have a 10-12 
year frequency and ideally we should include more than one cycle in an 
analysis. Other studies have achieved larger samples by using bi-annual or 
quarterly data. However this approach may require the use of dummies to 
control for seasonality, and this could impose degrees-of-freedom 
constraints. Furthermore, unless a long run of quarterly data is available, 
the analysis may still be restricted to a single market cycle.13 A reliable series 
of quarterly data is not available for the Dublin market over multiple office 
cycles. In this context, the 32-year annual dataset described below is 
acceptable for the simple analysis herein.  
4. 
Developing a 
Statistical 
Model – Data 
and Variables  
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
As outlined above, the dependent variable for our model is Dublin office 
completions. This is measured in square metres per annum. A gross 
measure (i.e. before same-year demolitions are netted out) is appropriate as 
our objective is to explain new building activity rather than stock 
movements. The data come from Lisney which updates an inventory of 
finished Dublin office buildings every three months.14 Lisney defines a 
building as completed when it has been certified as ‘practically complete’ by 
the architect. 
 
 
 
 
13 For example, Fuerst (2006) uses 11 years of quarterly data. 
14 Therefore, the completions data used in this analysis are backed-up with an itemised list 
of identifiable buildings completed in each period.  
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INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
In specifying the right-hand-side of the equation, the aim is to derive a 
parsimonious model that explains as much of the variation in Dublin office 
completions as possible using the minimum number of independent 
variables necessary.  
 
Given our hypothesis that office building is demand-led, a logical point 
of departure is to introduce variables which might signal to developers that 
there is a market requirement for more office space. Therefore, rental 
growth, which contains information on office demand relative to the stock 
of available space, was included in the model as an explanatory variable.15 
Rental growth is operationalised as the annual percentage change in the 
nominal rent for a square metre of modern Dublin office space. The data 
used derive from the Lisney Rental Indices which have been published since 
1970.16 Rents in this series are defined as the ‘bald’ headline rent on new 
leases, without adjustment for rent-free periods and other incentives.17 
 
As discussed above, while rental growth is likely to influence building 
starts in real time, the dependent variable in this analysis is completions. 
The effect of rents on completions is likely to occur with some delay due to 
the time elapsed between commencing and finishing an office building. 
Given estimates of an 18-month construction phase, it was unclear a priori 
whether rental growth should be regressed against completions with a one 
or two-year lag adjustment term. Therefore a two-staged process was 
employed to shed light on this matter. First, line graphs of rental growth in 
periods t-1 and t-2 were overlaid on a plot showing growth in office 
completions. This simple visual test suggested that completions tended to 
follow trends in rental growth with a two-year lag. This was corroborated 
with an examination of the correlation matrix – whereas rental growth in t-
1 had a zero-order correlation of 0.23 with the dependent variable, rental 
growth in t-2 exhibited a much stronger relationship of 0.50. Consequently, 
rental growth in period t-2 was entered into the right-hand-side of our 
equation. 
 
Take-up is another variable which may potentially influence office 
development. Although it is an imperfect proxy of the net additional 
demand for office space, take-up does provide developers and funding 
institutions with key information on transactional activity. This, in itself, is 
likely to influence construction decisions. When letting activity is brisk, 
 
15 Some measure of rents has been included as an explanatory variable in virtually all 
previous econometric models of metropolitan office supply (Hendershott et al. 1999, 
McDonald, 2002; Pollakowski et al., 1992; Wheaton et al., 1997; McGough and Tsolacos, 
1999). 
16 The Lisney Rental Indices are a weighted average of rental movements in 12 office 
locations across Dublin. A full methodological description of these indices is available in 
Lisney Rental Indices (March 2007). 
17 In theory, net effective rents, which adjust for factors such as rent-free periods, capital 
contributions to fit-out costs etc. may be a more precise indicator of market conditions 
(McDonald, 2002). In practice, however, these are notoriously difficult to measure due to 
complex lease variations and the confidential nature of the information required to make 
accurate adjustments.   
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developers will perceive that there are greater opportunities to find tenants 
for a new building – either by attracting new occupiers or by ‘poaching’ 
tenants from existing buildings. For this reason, a take-up measure was also 
introduced to our explanatory model. 
 
As with rental growth, the take-up variable in our equation is 
operationalised using Lisney data.18 It is measured gross (i.e. no adjustment 
for space vacated in relocations), in square metres, and refers to leases 
actually signed in any given year.19 As per our discussion of the rental 
growth variable above, take-up is expected to influence completions with a 
lag. Again, however, it is unclear whether the appropriate lag period should 
be one or two years. As before, a two-staged process was employed to 
determine this matter. In the first step, a line graph of take-up was 
superimposed on a graph of completions. Figure 3 indicates that, in this 
case, the lagged effect was closer to one year than two. This was confirmed 
in step two. The correlation matrix showed that the relationship between 
completions and take-up in period t-1 (0.76) was stronger than in period t-2 
(0.63). Therefore, take–up was included in our equation with just a one-
year lag. 
Figure 3: Take-up and Office Completions – A One Year Lag 
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It is interesting to consider why rental growth appears to take longer to 
influence developer behaviour than take-up. One possibility is that there is 
an information asymmetry between take-up and rents. Developers and 
investors have a strong incentive to publicise new lettings because this 
creates a favourable impression of their buildings and can help to attract 
additional occupiers. In practice, therefore, lettings tend to be quickly 
reported in the national press and can be brought to bear in developers’ 
construction decisions almost immediately. However, the incentive to 
publicise rental information may be much weaker, particularly if rents have 
been heavily discounted. As a result, it has been suggested that rental 
 
18 Published in Lisney Annual Review various years (1974-2007). 
19 Lisney tracks take-up by updating a list of office leases signed in each quarter. As with 
completions, this means that the data are backed-up by an itemised list of lettings. 
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information may leak more slowly into the market, causing a delayed effect 
on completions. While this is an interesting theory, it is not entirely 
convincing for two reasons. First, contrary to the suggestion that rental 
information is slow to surface, indicative rental indices for the Dublin 
office market are available with relatively short reporting lags from various 
sources, including Investment Property Databank Ltd. (IPD), Lisney and 
Jones Lang LaSalle. Second, even if it were true that rental information 
seeps out slowly, this would only explain the delay between actual rental 
movements and movements in measured rent. The adjustment term in our 
model refers to a different lag – the delay between measured rental growth 
and a supply reaction.  
 
In light of this, a more cogent – albeit speculative – explanation is that 
developers are not just interested in whether rents are growing in the year 
that starts are initiated. They may also be interested in how quickly rents are 
growing in that year (t-1) relative to rental growth rates in the previous year 
(t-2). This second-derivative measure may be important to developers 
because it can help them to identify what stage the rental market is at on its 
long-term cycle. To illustrate, office rents can grow at an annual rate of 5 
per cent twice in the cycle – once on the way up and once on the way 
down. But on the upswing, the 5 per cent growth will be preceded by 
weaker growth the year before, whereas on the downswing the previous 
year would have seen stronger growth. Clearly, developers might be more 
confident to initiate building works when the market is improving (i.e. 
rental growth accelerating between t-2 and t-1) than when it is in decline. 
 
Contrary to a priori expectations, no specification of either GNP or 
GDP growth was significant in our regression model.20 The most likely 
reason for this is multicollinearity – i.e. the relationship between overall 
economic growth and office completions is intermediated by factors 
already included among our explanatory variables. Two factors seem to 
support this diagnosis. First, while real GNP and GDP growth are both 
significant when regressed against completions without any other 
independent variables,21 their effects evaporate when rent growth and take-
up are also included in the model. Second, although both GNP and GDP 
are correlated with office completions, they are also correlated with the 
other explanatory variables in our model, particularly in two-year lagged 
form. 
 
Intuitively, one would expect employment growth to create a demand 
for more office space, which in turn should encourage development. 
However, employment had little effect in our model. A similar finding was 
discovered by McGough and Tsolacos (1999) in the UK and one possible 
explanation is that the ‘space occupied per employee ratio’ may not be a 
constant. For example, trends towards more open plan office 
accommodation or efforts by firms to utilise their office space more 
 
20 GNP and GDP variables were introduced to the model in lags from 0-2 years. T-
statistics on the relevant coefficients  ranged from 0.23 to 1.45. 
21 T-statistics in two-year lagged specifications were 4.73 and 4.98 for GNP and GDP 
respectively. 
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intensively in the face of stronger economic activity could weaken the 
relationship between employment growth and office demand (D’Arcy et al,. 
1999). Similarly, a change in the occupational mix – e.g. a growing cohort 
of managers who tend to be assigned more office space than clerical 
workers – may have a similar effect (Wheaton, Torto and Evans, 1997). 
However, as with economic growth, the insignificance of employment as a 
predictor of completions could also be due to collinearity in the right-hand-
side variables. Although employment was strongly correlated with office 
completions (r = 0.59-0.64 depending on lag specification), it was also very 
closely associated with take-up (r = 0.87-0.91).  
 
A final reason for the insignificance of employment could be the 
specification of the variables tested in our model. Neither total 
employment numbers (measured on a Principal Economic Status basis) nor 
the annual change in overall employment yielded significant results. 
However, the relationship between these measures and office building may 
be diluted by the fact that a great deal of jobs creation has occurred outside 
of office-based sectors. For example, just 25 per cent of overall 
employment growth in the last eleven years has occurred in the office-
intensive sectors of ‘Financial and Other Business Services’ and ‘Public 
Administration and Defence’. A further problem arises from the fact that 
much of the jobs growth outside these sectors has occurred in the building 
industry itself. Latest figures show that 21 per cent of overall employment 
growth since the commencement of the Quarterly National Household Survey 
in 1997 has been in construction. As many of the workers that make up 
this statistic have been engaged in office building, endogeniety may be an 
issue (i.e. there may be bilateral causality between overall employment 
growth and office output). Endogeniety can lead to biased and inconsistent 
OLS estimators and it is possible that this affected our estimated 
employment coefficient. An obvious solution to these specification 
problems is to obtain a data series which isolates office-based employment 
(see Rankin and White, 2008; Wheaton, Torto and Evans, 1997). However, 
this is not a straightforward exercise. Over the last 32 years there have been 
changes to both the survey instrument for collecting official employment 
data and to the sectoral classifications for identifying ‘office-based’ 
employment. Therefore, although it may be possible to develop an 
acceptable series for office based employment, this task is flagged for 
further research. In the meantime, no employment measure was included in 
our final model. 
 
In a review of the international literature, McDonald (2002) found that 
elasticity of supply estimates for metropolitan office markets cluster in the 
2.0-4.0 range. One interpretation is that, in the past, factors such as the cost 
and availability of credit do not appear to have acted as a major constraint 
on office building. It is not entirely surprising, then, that neither nominal 
nor real interest rates had any significant effect on our regression results, 
and this is consistent with the findings of previous research in the UK.22 
Consequently, interest rates were excluded from our estimated model. This 
notwithstanding, however, it is now becoming clear that the crisis in 
 
22 See McGough and Tsolacos (1999) and Wheaton, Torto and Evans (1997). 
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financial markets could fundamentally alter lending practices and credit 
conditions in the future. Therefore, it may be necessary to incorporate this 
affect into our model going forward.  
 
Bearing all of these discussions in mind, the final variables included in 
our model are summarised in Table 2 below. 
Table 2: Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 
     
Variable Variable Type Description Mean S.D. 
Completions Dependent Sq M of office space 
‘practically completed’, year t. 
 
79,125 72,759 
Rental 
Growth  
Independent Percentage change in 
nominal office rents, year t-2. 
 
8.73 13.29 
Take-Up Independent Sq M of office space for 
which leases were signed, 
year t-1. 
 
88,977 72,246 
 
 The model outlined above was estimated using OLS and the results of 
this exercise are presented in Table 3 below. Despite the fact that the 
analysis is restricted to 32 annual observations, the model provides a good 
fit. Looking first at statistics for the full equation, the R2 is 0.82. This 
indicates that 82 per cent of all the variation in Dublin office completions 
since 1976 is explained by our model. This level of explanatory power is 
encouraging considering that just two independent variables are included in 
the analysis, and the regression R2 compares well with those reported in the 
international literature.23 A Durbin-Watson statistic of 1.37 indicates no 
correlation in the error terms at 1 per cent.24 
5. 
Regression 
Results 
Table 3: OLS Model of Dublin Office Completions 
 
Dependent Variable: Completions (Sq M per annum) 
 
Regression Statistics 
R2 
2  
F 
   0.82 
   0.80 
64.89* 
D.W.    1.37 
Independent 
Variable 
Description Coefficient T-Statistic (Absolute) 
Constant  -11,159.70 1.14 
Rent Growth  ∆% Y/Y 2,323.17* 5.34 
Take-Up Sq M Let 0.79* 9.84 
    
N = 32. * Significant at 1 per cent. 
 
 
23 R2 values on previous office supply equations range from 0.19 (Rosen, 1984 – San 
Francisco) to 0.88 (Wheaton, Torto and Evans, 1997 – London). Pollakowski et al. (1992) 
estimate supply equations for 21 US cities with R2 statistics of 0.49-0.69. Fuerst’s (2006) 
equation for Manhattan yielded an R2 of 0.60. Hendershott et al. (1999) estimate 
completions equations for London with adjusted R2s of 0.50-0.82. 
24 A lagged-dependent version of the model was also tested. The results were similar to 
those reported above and the lagged dependent coefficient was not significant.  
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The graph below compares actual office completions in the 1976-2007 
period against those predicted by the model. Not only does this picture 
confirm the explanatory power of the model, it also demonstrates that the 
model is very good at ‘calling’ turning-points in the building cycle. Over a 
32-year period, the model has predicted three of the four construction 
peaks to the exact year. In the fourth case, it was just out, predicting a 
marginally higher completions rate in 1981 than in 1982 when completions 
actually peaked. This ability to identify peaks and troughs in the cycle is 
impressive, particularly considering the context – the Dublin market is 
small in absolute terms and completions in any given year can, therefore, be 
sensitive to one or two large individual projects (D’Arcy et al., 1999).  
Figure 4: Actual vs Predicted Office Completions, 1976-2007 
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Looking at the individual variables, lagged rental growth and lagged 
take-up have positive signs as expected, meaning that both are positively 
associated with higher office completions. In addition, both variables are 
significant at the 1 per cent level. This indicates that there is less than a one 
per cent probability that coefficients of the magnitude reported could occur 
if the underlying relationship with office completions was zero. This 
evidence appears to support the overarching hypothesis that developers’ 
construction decisions are driven by signals of market demand.  
 
The finding that lagged rents are positively associated with office 
development is consistent with empirical evidence from other metropolitan 
markets (see Fuerst 2006, Hendershott et al., 1999). A simple interpretation 
is that strong rental growth in previous periods is taken as an indication 
that office space is scarce relative to demand.25 This appears to give 
developers confidence that, if they construct new office buildings, 
occupiers can be found for the finished product. A closely related but more 
 
25 Some previous models have used vacancy rates as an alternative measure of the 
demand/supply balance (Rosen, 1984; Wheaton, Torto and Evans, 1997). However, 
consistent data on vacancy rates in Dublin are only available back to 1987. In trial 
regressions over this truncated period the vacancy rate was not significant in lags from 0-2 
years (t-statistics = 0.37-1.33). 
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formal interpretation is that strong rental growth raises the present value of 
new buildings above construction costs, thereby making office 
development viable.  
 
Interpretation of the take-up coefficient is similar in principle. To the 
extent that some portion of take-up derives from occupiers shifting around 
within the existing office stock, this is an imperfect measure of the 
requirement for additional space. However, it is an accurate measure of 
transactional activity, and when take-up is strong developers are likely to 
see greater opportunities to lease their buildings – either to relocating 
occupiers or to new entrants to the Dublin market. In this sense, even in a 
market that is not growing, strong take-up gives developers the chance to 
achieve lettings by attracting occupiers from other buildings. 
FORECASTS FOR DUBLIN OFFICE COMPLETIONS 2008-2010 
It is useful to apply our estimated equation to the task of forecasting office 
output in the years ahead. For 2008, the following values were substituted 
into the model; 
 
• 2006 rental growth (i.e. rental growth t-2) = 11.34 per cent • 2007 take-up (i.e. take-up t-1) = 299,009 sq m  
 
This gave us the following equation; 
 
 
 
 
 
2008 Completions = -11,159.70 + 2,323.17 (11.34) + 0.79 (299,009)  
 
Solving for this equation yields a 2008 completions forecast of 251,402 
sq m. If correct, this would mean that office output in 2008 would be on a 
par with 2007 which had the second highest level of completions ever 
recorded in the Dublin market. It should be noted, however, that this 
forecast understates Lisney’s estimate that a total of 361,071 sq m will be 
completed in 2008.26 The latter is based on actual completions in quarters 
one and two, plus works already underway at end-June 2008 that are 
scheduled for completion before year-end.  
 
The forecasting process for 2009 is slightly complicated because take-up 
in t-1 (i.e. in 2008) is currently unknown. Therefore, office 
agents/researchers in Dublin’s larger real estate companies were canvassed 
for a 2008 take-up estimate.27 Their predictions were averaged to give an 
expected take-up of approximately 180,000 sq m. This number was then 
substituted into the model, along with the known figure of 0 per cent rental 
growth in 2007. 
 
 2009 Completions = -11,159.70 + 2,323.17 (0) + 0.79 (180,000) 
 
26 Lisney, Dublin Office Market Update, July 2008. 
27 A telephone poll was conduced in mid-June 2008. Five firms responded with a definitive 
figure; Savills HOK, DTZ Sherry FitzGerald, CBRE, Lisney and Bannon Property 
Consultants. The precise average of their forecasts was 179,032 sq m. 
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This exercise predicts office completions of 131,040 sq m in 2009, 
which would represent a 48 per cent downturn in office building over the 
next twelve months. While this estimate may appear quite extreme, it is 
entirely in line with past experience – the average fall-off in office 
completions in the years immediately following previous construction 
peaks (1983, 1992 and 2002) was 53 per cent. 
 
Generating a 2010 forecast is less straightforward because it requires 
assumptions about both input variables – rental growth in t-2 (i.e. 2008) 
and take-up in t-1 (i.e. 2009). However, using realistic figures based on 
practitioner estimates and an analysis of previous market cycles, the model 
suggests that 2010 completions will be in the 100,000–125,000 sq m range. 
However, this early forecast should be taken as tentative, particularly in 
light of uncertainties around the deepening financial crisis and its affect on 
funding. 
 
Overall, then, our regression analysis shows that office completions are 
a function of two simple factors –  lagged rental growth and lagged take-up. 
Based on known and expected values for these variables, our model 
predicts that Dublin office completions will be at or near a cyclical peak in 
2008, before dropping sharply in 2009 and 2010. 
 
 Two key findings have emerged from the above analysis. First, it seems 
that office building in Dublin is strongly demand-led. The regression 
equation elaborated above supports the hypothesis that supply follows 
demand with a time lag. A second finding is that the Dublin office market 
is highly cyclical. Certainly this is the case for completions, with four output 
peaks clearly visible over the last three decades. But strong cyclicality is also 
evident in many of the other key variables e.g. rental growth, vacancy rates, 
occupancy and take-up.   
6.  
Discussion  
 
Given these findings, one key question remains – What, if any, 
relationship is there between the demand-driven nature of Dublin office 
building and the cyclical pattern that appears to characterise the market 
over time? In answering this question, the international literature may 
provide assistance. As discussed above, Dublin is far from unique in having 
a strongly cyclical office market. Indeed, so common are commercial real 
estate cycles that numerous models have been developed to explain them.28 
One simple model, proposed by Mueller (1999), provides a useful 
framework for analysing the dynamics behind cycles in the Dublin market.  
A SIMPLE DESCRIPTIVE MODEL OF OFFICE MARKET CYCLES 
Mueller’s model focuses on occupancy variations in real estate cycles.29 
Based on observed trends in 54 US markets over a 30-year time frame, it 
identifies four classic stages within the typical cycle: 
 
28 Phyrr, Roulac and Born (1999) review eight models of real estate cycles. 
29 Occupancy is the percentage of total office stock currently occupied. It is simply the 
vacancy rate subtracted from one hundred.  
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Stage 1 – Recovery 
Beginning at the trough of the cycle, occupancy rates are well below their 
long-term average. Vacant space is abundant due to overbuilding towards 
the end of the previous cycle. This glut of surplus accommodation leads to 
negative rental growth which discourages new construction. 
Stage 2 – Expansion 
As time passes, natural economic growth helps to digest the overhang of 
surplus office space on the market. Occupancy rates slowly recover to their 
long-term average and, as availability becomes tighter, rents stop falling 
before stabilising and beginning to rise. Eventually, they exceed the point 
where new office development becomes viable. Office starts begin to 
occur, but due to long construction lead times, the new space is not 
immediately available to the market. As a result, rental growth continues to 
accelerate, peaking towards the end of this phase. 
Stage 3 – “Hyper Supply” 
Occupancy rates are above their long-term average and rental growth 
remains very strong, particularly in the early part of this phase. This attracts 
the attention of more developers and the number of new starts increases. 
As this phase continues, however, buildings that were commenced during 
the previous (expansion) stage now begin to find their way onto the 
market. Eventually, this growth in supply causes occupancy levels to ease 
back towards their average. As a result, rental growth also begins to cool-
off. Belatedly, developers realise that the balance of the market has tipped 
towards oversupply and commitments to new construction slow or stop. 
However, projects already commenced in this phase are past the point of 
no return and will be built-out.30 
Figure 5: Mueller’s Four Stages of the Office Market Cycle 
 
 
30 Grenadier (1995) notes that the inability to reverse construction start decisions is a 
factor in over supply. 
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Stage 4 – Recession 
Completions of new office buildings that were started during the hyper 
supply stage now come to the market, compounding the oversupply that 
started to emerge towards the latter part of stage three. Occupancy rates are 
driven below their long-term average and rental growth turns negative. 
New office construction remains subdued. 
 
Having looked at Mueller’s theoretical model, it is useful to apply this 
schematic to actual events in Dublin over the last office market cycle. This 
cycle lasted approximately a decade and spanned the years 1992-2002, 
trough-to-trough.  
Dublin Market 1992-1995 – Recovery Stage 
In 1992 the market was at its cyclical trough with occupancy levels down at 
89.8 per cent. Because there was an abundance of un-let space, rents fell by 
13.2 per cent that year. Reflecting this, developers were not attracted into 
the market, and very little construction took place (completions fell from 
117,052 sq m in 1991 to around 23,000 sq m in 1993 and 1994 – an 80 per 
cent decline). 
 
During this phase, however, the Irish economy performed well, with 
GDP growth averaging 5.3 per cent per annum in real terms. This 
generated a natural increase in the demand for office accommodation and 
take-up rose accordingly. As a result, the surplus of vacant space was 
gradually absorbed. Occupancy rates returned to their long-term average by 
1995, while rents stopped falling and began to recover. 
Figure 6: Dublin Office Market Cycle 1992-2002  
 
Dublin Market 1995-1998 – Expansion Stage  
Occupancy rates continued to climb during this period as a sustained 
increase in take-up consumed much of the surplus space that had been 
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available during the recovery phase. Rental growth, which had resumed in 
1994, began to accelerate. This, combined with strong lettings activity, 
attracted some developers back into office building. From our earlier 
analysis we would expect this to have led to higher completions after a lag. 
In practice, this is exactly what happened – Dublin office completions rose 
by 140 per cent in 1996. Initially, however, construction lags meant that 
available space remained quite tight in this period. This led to continued 
rental growth, which averaged 11.5 per cent per annum between 1995-
1998. In turn, this encouraged further development with commencements 
continuing to rise strongly.  
Dublin Market 1998-2001 – Hyper Supply Stage  
Occupancy and take-up reached their highest point in 1998 with rental 
growth peaking one year later at 33.3 per cent. Around that time, new 
completions (reflecting strong starts in the latter part of Stage 2) caught up 
with, and then overtook, demand. Inevitably this led to the beginnings of a 
rental slowdown. At first, however, this may not have been obvious to 
developers; even though rental growth slowed in 2000, it remained almost 
three times higher than the long-term average at 24 per cent. As a result, 
new office starts continued to occur, eventually leading to an all-time 
completions record of 315,455 sq m in 2001. 
Dublin Market 2001-2002 – Recession Stage  
By 2001 the Dublin market was showing clear signs of overbuilding. Partly, 
this was because some developers failed to recognise that strong rental 
growth in the previous period was only temporary – i.e. reflecting a short-
lived scarcity of space pending the completion of office buildings that had 
already been commenced.31 However, this problem was compounded by an 
abrupt softening of office demand due to three separate shocks that hit the 
economy in quick succession – the bursting of the dot.com bubble, the 
outbreak of foot and mouth disease and the September 11th 2001 attacks. 
These shocks meant that the high take-up levels which prompted strong 
office starts back in 2000 had evaporated by the time the buildings were 
completed. Occupancy fell to 84 per cent, while rental growth swung from 
+24.3 per cent in 2000 to -3.5 per cent in 2001. Paradoxically, despite this 
clear evidence of over supply, completions remained very strong in 2002. 
With the benefit of our regression model we can say that this occurred 
because office starts, which had been initiated on foot of strong demand 
signals in the latter half of 2000, continued to come on-stream as 
completions. This amplified the crisis with both rents and occupancy falling 
further in 2002. 
 
The above example is not unique – similar patterns have been observed 
in many other countries and, indeed, in previous cycles of the Dublin 
market. However, it does help us to understand how the demand driven 
nature of office development contributes to market cyclicality. The up-
front costs associated with office development are enormous. 
Consequently, developers want to be sure that there is a strong market for 
 
31 See Herring and Wachter (1999) for a more general discussion of this dynamic. 
86  
new office space before they commit major resources to a scheme. 
However, in the context of a significant construction lag, the two key 
indicators that they rely on to gauge market demand are imperfect. On one 
hand, the rental growth indicator can give misleading signals if it is viewed 
in isolation. Instead, this indicator needs to be assessed in conjunction with 
the amount of space-under-construction. To illustrate the importance of 
this, consider two examples from our recent past. Rental growth was 
elevated in both 1999 and 2006. But the amount of office space already 
under construction was also abnormally high in those years. In this context 
it should have been predictable that rents were likely to soften when the 
schemes under construction were finished and delivered to market. 
However, failure to adequately account for this contributed to significant 
overbuilding in 2001 and again in 2007-2008.  
 
If rental growth is not, on its own, a perfect market signal, the 
limitations of take-up are even more obvious. While strong lettings may 
provide an accurate guide to the strength of the market when projects are 
commenced, an 18 month construction lag means that conditions can have 
changed dramatically by the time these schemes are completed. This factor 
also contributed to overshooting supply following the 2001 slowdown, and 
a similar oversupply is now emerging as the ‘credit crunch’ begins to 
undermine office demand.  
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
As was witnessed in America during the 1980s, and as we are now 
beginning to see in Ireland, over development at the peak of office cycles 
can have a strongly adverse impact on the finances of developers, investors 
and lenders – not to mention national economies (see Herring and 
Wachter, 1999; Howarth and Malizia 1998; McDonald 2002; Phyrr, Roulac 
and Born, 1999). In light of this, and given the discussion above, it is 
natural to ask whether anything can be done to smooth out cyclical peaks 
and troughs.  
 
Clearly, developers can do little to prevent the economic shocks that 
sometimes lead to a sudden collapse in office demand between the 
commencement and completion of schemes. These events are inherently 
unpredictable and they are often global rather than domestic in origin. 
Nonetheless, several factors might minimise the extent to which these 
shocks result in an overhang of unwanted office space. A number of 
authors e.g. Grenadier (1995) and Wheaton (1999) have found that longer 
construction lags increase the probability of overbuilding. This makes 
perfect sense, since lengthy gaps between commencement and completion 
contribute to supply bottlenecks which can cause temporary, and 
potentially misleading, rental spikes. At the same time, longer construction 
lags leave more opportunity for demand shocks to occur. In this context, 
modern methods of construction (MMCs) and other innovations (e.g. 
administrative streamlining) which shorten the gestation of major office 
projects may help to reduce overbuilding at the peak of market cycles. 
 
In addition, reducing the proportion of speculative construction should 
lessen the extent to which demand shocks result in large surpluses of empty 
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office space following construction peaks. In practice, however, achieving 
this might be easier said than done. It has traditionally been difficult for 
developers to pre-let office space in Dublin.32 This probably derives from 
the small size profile of the typical Dublin office occupier. Larger tenants 
may be prepared to enter pre-letting arrangements because their 
accommodation requirements are difficult to satisfy from the stock of 
space that is available ‘off-the-shelf’. However, these big occupiers only 
form a small part of the Dublin market. For example, between 2002-2007, 
deals of 5,000 sq m or more averaged only 3.7 per cent of annual 
transactions, and just 30 per cent of the total space let across Dublin each 
year. Instead, the bulk of activity involves small and medium sized 
occupiers who are much less willing to enter into pre-letting arrangements. 
There are several reasons for this. First, because the Dublin market 
traditionally provides ample opportunities to let finished office suites in the 
500-2,000 sq m range, their accommodation requirements can usually be 
met from the frictional stock of office space available at any given time. 
For this reason, smaller occupiers have less incentive to pre-let. Second, 
smaller organisations do not have the same financial strength as State 
bodies and big global corporates. This may make them less willing to pre-
commit to long-term leases, particularly in times of economic turbulence 
when their hiring plans are uncertain. Third, some smaller enterprises may 
see their size and flexibility as a strategic advantage which they are unwilling 
to relinquish by entering into leasing pre-commitments.  
 
In addition to reducing construction lags and speculative building, a 
third recommendation might be for development stakeholders to take 
greater cognisance of space already under construction when appraising 
proposals for new office schemes. Our regression model suggests that 
developers rely heavily on rental growth when deciding whether or not to 
build. But rental growth can be temporarily elevated pending the 
completion of buildings that are already under construction. Therefore, to 
get the complete picture it is essential to supplement a rental market 
analysis with research on the amount of space in progress. A corollary of 
this is that real estate firms should continue to develop their supply-side 
data and provide the market with detailed and timely information on this 
critical factor (see D’Arcy et al., 1999).  
 
Even with these efforts, however, natural economic cycles and the 
inevitability of construction lags mean that some element of cyclicality in 
office building probably cannot be avoided. Therefore, a final suggestion is 
that development practitioners simply ensure that they take cognisance of 
market cycles when evaluating new office schemes (Phyrr, Roulac and 
Born, 1999). In itself, this may discourage behaviour which amplifies 
market peaks and troughs. For example, several authors emphasise the 
mean-reverting nature of office rents and argue that factoring this into 
discounted cash flow analyses can help to avoid excessive construction 
 
32 To illustrate the scale of the challenge, consider that, at end-June 2008, substantially less 
than 20 per cent of the 428,471 sq m total office space under construction in Dublin was 
reserved (Lisney Dublin Office Market Update, July 2008). 
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peaks based on over optimistic valuations during the good times.33 Other 
authors, e.g. Carn et al. (1988) take an even more pragmatic view. They 
argue that natural cycles in the office market make the timing of 
development extremely important. Understanding these cycles will help 
developers, funding institutions and investors to identify ‘development 
windows’. Not only might this improve the profitability of individual 
projects, it should also dampen the amplitude of office cycles themselves. 
 
 Econometric analysis of commercial real estate markets is a relatively new 
discipline which really only emerged in the 1990s. This was largely driven 
by a desire to better understand the boom-bust cycles which led to heavy 
losses for lenders, developers and investors in US office property during 
the 1980s (Howarth and Malizia, 1998; McDonald, 2002). In Ireland, the 
econometric approach is rare, and an office supply model has never 
previously been estimated.34 However, given strong evidence that the 
Dublin office market is now overbuilt, considering persistent speculation 
about the role of commercial property lending in the Irish banking crisis, 
and in view of the fact that construction employment is already in sharp 
decline, this paper is timely. For sure, it does not address all the gaps in our 
knowledge of Irish commercial property markets. For one thing, its scope 
is quite narrowly focused. Furthermore, data constraints restrict us to a 
very simple analysis. But despite these limitations, this article adds value to 
our understanding of the Dublin office market by confirming two key 
conclusions. First, simple demand signals such as rental growth and take-up 
are the trigger for office starts, which then materialise as completions 
approximately 18 months later. Second, and partly because of this demand-
driven behaviour, the Dublin office market is highly cyclical.   
7. 
Conclusions 
 
It is hoped that, by modelling these dynamics, this article will be of 
practical assistance in two ways. First, it should make it easier for our 
macroeconomic analysts to accurately forecast the office building 
component of gross fixed capital formation. The analysis herein shows that 
Dublin’s office market is now entering the recession phase of its cycle. 
Over-building has driven occupancy rates well below their long-term 
average and, as a result, headline rents are falling. Consequently, although 
office completions remained strong through 2008, the flow of new starts 
has now dried up.35 Inevitably, this means that completions will fall sharply 
over the next two years. The model presented above indicates that office 
output will fall by 48 per cent in 2009, followed by a further 14 per cent 
drop in 2010. Although severe, it should be noted that these estimates are 
consistent with the scale of retrenchment experienced following previous 
peaks in the office building cycle. In economic terms, a slowdown of this 
 
33 See Hendershott (1996a) who analysed the Sydney office market in the 1980s and 1990s.  
Also see Mueller (1999) whose conclusions were based on US data. A more general 
assertion of this point can be read in Herring and Wachter (1999). It is, however, unclear 
how factors such as upward-only rent review and infrequent break-clauses (as often found 
in Dublin office leases) might affect this conclusion.  
34 D’Arcy et al. (1999) do, however, estimate a rent adjustment equation for the Dublin 
office market using data from an earlier 1970-1997 period.   
35 See DTZ Sherry FitzGerald Dublin Office Market Autumn Review (2008). 
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magnitude will directly deduct between 0.5 per cent and 0.6 per cent from 
nominal GNP by 201036 and will cost the economy approximately 7,500 
construction jobs.37  
 
This article may also add value in a second way. By exposing the 
underlying reasons behind market cyclicality it should contribute to the 
knowledge-base of Ireland’s commercial property stakeholders.  
Specifically, it is hoped that the perspectives outlined above may provide 
developers and funding institutions with additional information which can 
be applied to the appraisal and scheduling of proposed office schemes. 
 
 
36 Ceteris paribus, compared to forecast GNP of €158,228 million in 2008 (Barrett et al., 
2008).  Estimates assume a similar decline in Ireland’s smaller office markets. However, 
the impact would be magnified if similar dynamics were assumed in other areas of 
commercial building, and if indirect effects were taken into account.  
37 Ceteris paribus, compared to estimated office construction employment at Q3 2008, 
derived as follows; Total construction employment in Q3 2008 = 257,300 persons, of 
which 44.5 per cent (114,499) are engaged in non-residential building. Applying office 
share of non-residential output to this figure gives an estimate of 13,648 currently engaged 
in office construction.   
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